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Property taxes are a potentially attractive way to finance munici-
pal government, but property taxes typically provide less than 20
percent of municipal revenues. Procedural, policy, and institu-
tional reform can be achieved only in the context of the wider
restructuring of local finance - because property tax caries  a
heavy political price.
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The property tax is , potentially attractive way to  to the entity most directly affected by it-
give local governments access to a broad and  municipal government.
expanding tax base.  Unlike the mix of
intergovemment grants and indirect taxes that  *  Taxes must be indexed.  To maintain the
now dominate municipal revenues, it can also  real level of tax liabilities, tax authorities must
promote broader objectives of efficiency - either revalue annually (which is expensive) or
linking the provision of municipal services more  increase nominal tax rates.  One practical
closely to their financing, and rationing the  solution is to address inflation by adjusting
consumption of municipal services by price.  valuations "from the office" on the basis of a
common inflation indicator.
But urban property taxes, albeit ubiquitous,
typically yield less than 20 percent of municipal  *  To give the tax administration agency an
revenues.  incentive to perforn,  the agency should be
placed on a paid, contractual basis so it has a
In part, these low yields reflect failures in the  direct financial interest in tax performance.
administration of the tax.  Many properties are
missing from the tax rolls, or are inaccurately  For all its economic virtures, the property tax
valued, and collection is extremely inefficient.  carries a high political price.  Its effectiveness in
There should be procedural reforms to improve  confronting taxpayers with the co.st  of municipal
coverage, the accuracy of valuation, and the  services gives it an unusually high political
efficiency of collection.  profile in developing countries.  As a result,
where local authorities have access to less
But procedural improvements alone are not  efficient but more politically acceptable revenue
enough.  Tax rates must also be increased. The  sources those tend to be exploited first.
scope of reform must be expanded to address the
systems for rate-setting and revaluation and the  So property tax reform can be achieved only
incentives confronting tax administrators.  in the context of wider rcstructuring of local
Certain rules should apply:  finance. The object of such reform should be to
reduce the extent of arbitrary subsidies between
Control over tax policy (including rate  jurisdictions and to confront local taxpayers with
setting) should generally be assigned exclusively  the cost of services they consume.
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1.  The  property  tax  is  a  potentially  attractive  means  of  financing  municipal
government  in  developing  countries. As  a  revenue  source,  it  can  provide  local
government  with  access  to  a  broad  and  expanding  tax  base.  In  contrast  to  the
mix  of  intergovernmental  grants  and  indirect  taxes  that  now  dominate  municipal
revenues,  it can also promote  broader  efficiency  objectives,  linking  the
provision  of  mtnicipal  services  more  closely  to  their  financing  and  rationing
the  consumption  of  municipal  services  by  price.
2.  At  present,  however,  yields  of  urban  property  taxes  in  developing  countries
are  extremely  low. Although  the  tax  is  ubiquitous-  -virtually  all  market  economy
developing  countries  assign  a  property  tax  to  their  municipal  governments--its
contribution  to  total  public  sector  tax.  revenues  is  negligible,  and  its  share
of  municipal  revenues  is  typically  less  than  20%.
Procedural  Reforms
3.  In  part,  these  low  yields  reflect  failures  in  the  administration  of  the
tax. A  large  proportion  of  properties  are  missing  from  the  tax  rolls,  properties
on  the  tax  rolls  are  inaccurately  valued,  and  collection  efficiency  is  extremely
poor.
4.  To an extent,  these  administrative  failures  can  be addressed  through
procedural  reforms:
Coverago  can  be improved  by changing  the  system  used  to discover  and
identify  property,  from  one  relying  on  owner-declarations  to  one  based  on
rudimentary  tax  maps;
Valuation  accuracy  can  be  improved  through  the  use  of  "mass  appraisal"--
a  simple,  formula-driven  valuation  method  that  minimizes  reliance  on  the
judgment  of  valuers  and  the  honesty  of  taxpayers;
Collection  efficiency  can be increased  by establishing  a system  of
collection  monitoring  that  more  readily  identifies  major  delinquents,  and
by  using  tax  clearances  to  enforce  payment.
PeliCy  and  Insaitutional  Reforms
5.  Procedural  improvements  alone,  however,  are  unlikely  to  have  a  significant,
sustained  impact  on  property  tax  yields. Unless  tax  rates  are  also  increased,
the  absolute  level  of  property  tax  liabilities  will  remain  low. Unless  a  system
for  annually  adjusting  valuations  (or  tax  rates)  is  introduced,  inflation  will
rapidly  erode  the  real  value  of  tax  liabilities.  And  unless  the  disincentives
confronting  the  agencies  responsible  for  administering  the  tax  are  addressed,
procedural  improvements  in coverage,  valuation,  and collection  will  not be
sustained.
6.  This  suggests  that  the  scope  of  reform  must  be expanded  to  address  the
systems  for rate setting  and revaluation,  and the incentives  confronting
administrators  of  the  tax.7.  Given the  diversity of  institutional  arrangements  used  in property
taxation,  the definition  of relevant  targets  will vary.  Recent  experience,
nevertheless,  provides  general  rules:
a. Rate  seting.  In  principle,  there  is  no 'right"  rate  of  property  tax.
If the  property  tax  is  functioning  as a  price  for  municipal  services,  the
"right" rate is the rate that reflects local preferences.  But the
multiplicity of  agencies with  veto power over property tax  policy
introduces  a downward  bias in rate setting.  Central  government's  veto
power  over  property  tax  policy  is  particularly  suspect,  as it  derives  no
revenue  from the tax.  Control  over tax policy  should, in general,  be
exclusively  assigned  to  the  entity  most  directly  affected  by it--municipal
gover-ment.
b.  Indexation. Indexing  valuations  can  help  maintai.  the  real level  of
property  tax  revenues  during  periods  of inflation. Because  the  property
tax is imposed  on a presumptive  basis,  tax valuations  do not increase
automatically  with rising  prices.  To maintain  the real level of tax
liabilities,  taxing  authorities  must  either  revalue  annually  or increase
nominal  tax  rates. Annual  field  revaluations,  however,  are  too  expensive,
and  annual  tax increases  are too  politically  controversial.  Countries
accustomed  to  inflation  address  this  problem  by  adjusting  valuations  "from
the  office,"  on the  basis  of a  common  inflation  indicator.  This solution
should  be more  widely  adopted.
c.  Administrative  incentives.  If central  government  is  responsible
administration  of  the  tax,  its  characteristic  indifference  to  performan,
of the  tex  can  be addressed  by  changing  the  terms  on  which  it  provides  this
service.  Placing  the tax administration  agency  on a paid,  contractual
basis  provides  it  with  a direct  financial  interest  in performance  of the
tax.
Changing  the  Structure  of Local  Revenues
8.  The scope  of reform  may have to include  the entire  structure  of local
finance.  Judging  from  recent  experience,  even  providing  local  government  with
complete  autonomy  over  tax  policy  and  administration  does  not  guarantee  that  the
tax  will be exploited  effectively. For  all its  economic  virtues,  the  property
tax  carries  a  high  political  price. Its  effectiveness  in  confronting  taxpayers
with  the  cost  of  municipal  services  gives  it  an  unusually  high  political  profile,
within  the  tax  structure  characteristic  of developing  countries. As a result,
where local authorities  have access to less efficient  but more politically
acceptable  revenue  sources,  these  tend  to  be exploited  first.
9.  Under these  conditions,  property  tax  reform  can  only  be achieved  in the
context  of wider  restructuring  in the  sources  of municipal  revenue.  Clearly,
the  objective  of such  reform  is  not to increase  property  tax  revenues,  per se:
high property  tax  revenues  are  not an end in themselves. But in reducing  the
extent of arbitrary subsidies  between jurisdictions  and confronting  local
texpayers with the cost of  the services they consume, these changes are
consistent  with,  and  necessary  to,  the  pursuit  of the  efficiency  objective  that
is the  principal  justification  for  property  tax  reform.FOREWORD
This paper  has  been prepazed  for  the  Municipal  Finance  component  of the
joint  UNDP/Vorld  Bank/UNCHS  Urban  Management  Program  (UMP). The  UMP represents
a  major approach  by the UN family  of organizations,  together  with external
support  age-cies  (ESAs),  to strengthen  the  contribution  that  cities  and towns
in developi  g countries  make towards  economic  growth,  social  development,  and
the  alleviation  of  poverty. The  program  seeks  to  develop  and  promote  appropriate
policies  and tools  for municipal  finance  and  administration,  land  management,
infrastructure  management,  and environmental  maragement.  Through  a capacity
building  component,  the UMP plans  to  establish  an effective  partnership  with
national, regional, and  global networks and  ESAs  in  applied resear-
dicsemination  of information,  and  experiences  of best practices  and  promising
options.
This report  is the  first  of a series  of management  tools  to be produced
by the UMP municipal finance  component.  ts a whole the municipal  finance
component  is intended  to  address  three  questions:  (1)  how  to  mobilize  resources
to finance  the delivery  of urban  services;  (2)  how to improve  the financial
management  of those  resources;  and (3)  how to organize  municipal  institutions
to  promote  greater  efficiency  and  responsiveness  in  urban  service  delivery.  Work
during  the  initial  phase  of  the  Urban  Management  Program  aas  focused  on  the  first
of  these  questions--focusing  specifically  on  local  tax  reform,  intergovernmental
transfers,  and local access  to long-term  credit.  Case studies  and background
papers  on  the  latter  questions--documenting  issues  in  local  financial  management
and  the  organization  of  municipal  government--have  also  been  prepared,  and  will
provide  the  basis  for  publications  to  be issued  under  this  series  in  the  future.
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14.  An  increasingly  large  share  ef  the  population  and  economic  activity  of
developing  countries  row  occuirs  in  cities.  Nearly  40%  of  the  population  of  the
developing  world  live  in  urban  areas. Urban  economies  now  account  for  the
majority  of  GDP  in  most  developing  countrie-.
1.2  The  continued  prodvuctivity  of  urban conomies  depends  upon  the  adequate
provision  of  urban  infrastructure  and  social  services.  While  there  are  many
constraints  on the  delivery  of these  services,  one of  the  most  universal  is
finance. Despite  the  buoyancy  of  urban  economies,  the  municipal  governments
responsible  for  urban  service  delivery  have  difficulty  mooilizing  resources.
The revenue  sources  available  to local  government,  moreover,  often  embody
arbitrary  subsidies  and  undermine  local  accountability.
1.3  Financial  reform  of municipal  government  is therefore  high  on the
agenda--not  merely  as  a  means  of  increasing  local  revenues,  but  also  as  a  means
of  linking  the  delivery  of  municipal  services  more  closely  to  its  financing  and
increasing  local  control  over  the  level  and  mix  of  municipal  services.
The  Emmonoc  Case  for  ProRerty  Taxation
1.4  In principle,  there  are  many  alternative  means  of increasing  the
revenues  of  municipal  government.  But  the  broader  economic  and  institutional
objectives  of  reform  narrow  the  options  and  provide  more  precise  guidelines  for
the  assignment  of  revenue  sources  to  municipal  government.  These  reflect  certain
assumptions  concerning  the  role  of  municipal  government  in  the  public  sector  as
a  whole.
1.5  Three  roles  are  conventionally  assigned  to  the  public  sector:  economic
stabilization,  income  redistribution,  and  allocation/public  service  provision.
The first  two  roles  are  generally  assigned  to central  government.  Central
government  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  executing  the  itabilization  function,
as local  economies  are too open  to permit  cnu,ktercyclical  measures  to be
implemented  effectively.  The  income  redistribution  role,  similarly,  is  best
performed  by  central  government:  local  attempts  to  address  income  disparities
are  likely  to  induce  inefficient  migration.  But  a  large  share  of  the  service-
provision  role  is  conventionally  assigned  to  local  ge--'nment.  Tastes  and
preferences  vary  among  individuals  and  communities,  a...  - elftre  gains  can  be
realized  if  consumers  are  in  a  position  to  choose  the  level  and  mix  of  services
that  best  suit  them.!'
1.6  If  consumers'  choices  are  to  be  efficient,  they  must  reflect  economic
costs  of  alternative  levels  of  consumption.  This  requirement  constrains  the
choice  of  revenue  sources  assigned  to  municipal  government.  Municipal  revenue
should  function  not  only  as  a  means  of  raising  funds,  but  also  as  a price  for
municipal  services.
1/  In  making  this  prescription,  theory  distinguishes  between  responsibility  for
provision-  -determining  the  level  of  service  provision-  -and  performing-  -actually
carrying  out  the  service,  a  function  that  can  be  performed  by  local  government,
private  contractors,  or  central  agencies.1.7  For  some  services,  this  requirement  can  be met through  user  charges.
In the  case of piped  water  supply,  for  example,  an individual  can  control  the
quantity  of his  consumption  through  a tap,  and  the  economic  cost  of alternative
levels  of consumption  can  be imposed  through  metering.
1.8  But there  "re cases  where rationing  municipal  services  through  user
charges  is  not feaslble. Charging  for the  use of congested  roads  is a  case  in
point.  In most circumstances,  the administrative  costs  of imposing  aite-and-
time specific  road charges  are disproportionate  to the  economic  benefits  they
would  yield.
1.9  Relying  on  user  charges  can  also  lead  to  inefficient  levels  of  service
provision,  because of the "public  goods"  nature  of some municipal  services.
Solld  waste management  is an example.  While some of the  benefits  of refuse
removal  accrue  directly  to individual  customers,  the  safe  disposal  of refuse  has
wider public  health  benefits.  If the level  of service  were confined  to what
individuals  were  willing  to pay in  the  form  of user fees,  the  service  would  be
underprovided:  while no individual  consumer  has an incentive  to reveal his
willingness  to  pay  for  wider  public  health  benefits,  all  would  be better  off  if
they  were provided.
1.10  These services  must be financed  through  taxes.  But taxes  can also
function  as prices,  relying  on the local  political  system  to reach  efficient
consumption  decisions  where the nature  of the service  does not permit  these
decisions  to  be  made  efficiently  by individual  consumers.  In  principle,  if  local
voters are confronted  with a choice  among alternative  service  levels, each
carrying  a  price  tag  in  terms  of a  tax  contribution,  then  their  decisions  at  the
polls  will induce  local  politicians  to  adopt  a level  of service  provision  that
corresponds  to their  constituen.s'  preferences.'
1.11  This outcome, clearly, depends upon the responsiveness  of local
government. It also  depends  upon  the  nature  of the  municipal  tax. If a tax  is
to function  as a price,  it  must  have  particular  characteristics.  It  must  be a
benefit tax; a tax whose incidence  corresponds  to the distribution  of the
benefits  of the service  it finances.  This is the primary  argument  for the
property  tax.  While  no tax  performs  perfectly  in thls role,  the  property  tax
is  more effective  than  the  alternatives.'
2/  In theory,  consumers  in metropolitan  areas  also  have the  option  of voting
with  their  feet. If  local  government  is  fragmented  into  many  jurisdictions,  each
offering  a fixed  level  of service  at  a given  tax  price,  consumers  would  be able
to  move  among  jurisdictions,  finding  a  combination  of  service  and  tax  levels  that
matches  their  preferences.
i/ A second  economic  case  is  made  for  the  property  tax,  based  on its  relatively
benign  impact  on the  efflciency  of resource  allocation  in the  private  economy.
The argument  reflects  the efficiency  criteria  used to evaluate  national  tax
instruments.  At the  national  level,  any  correspondence  between  the  incidence  and
benefits  of a particular  tax is  considered  irrelevant.  Efficiency  is therefore
defined as noninterference  with what is assumed  to be a perfectly  efficient
allocation  of resources  in the private  economy.  This  is  achieved  by imposing-3-
1.12  The  match  oetween  incidence  of the  property  tax  and  the  benefits  of
the  service  it  finances  is  clearly  far  from  perfect:  the  statutory  burden  of the
property  tax  is  distributed  according  to  value  of  property;  the  benefits  of the
services  it finances  are  not.  The  benefits  of refLse  collection,  for  example,
are  more  proportional  to  household  size  than  property  value. Ne-  ertheless,  the
property  tax is  more  effective  at confronting  taxpayers  with the  cost  of local
services  than are the other revenue  sources  that might be assigned  to local
government.
1.13  The  principal  alternatives  (as  illustrated  in  Annex  Fignkre  2)  consist
of intergovernmental  transfers--chiefly  revenue sharing--and  local indirect
taxes.  While transfers  can play a role in implementing  central government
stabilization  or distributional  policies,  t'-ey  cannot  function  as prices:  by
definition, the  level  of transfers  is  determined  exogenously.y  Local  indirect
taxes  also  make  bad  prices. The  direct  burden  of these  taxes--the  patent,  the
octroi, the business  and professions  tax--falls  on  business,  rather than on
residents  as a whole.  In the  short  term,  residents  have an incentive  to  vote
themselves  a subsidy. In the  long  term,  the  companies  paying  the  subsidy  have
an incentive  to  cut  back  production--shifting  the  burden  on  'o  taxpayers  in  other
jurisdictions-  -or  to  leave  the  jurisdiction  for  more  attractive,  but  economically
less  efficient,  locations.
1.14  The  economic  case for  the  urban  propercy  tax  is  therefore  persuasive.
The experience of developing  countries,  however, is that it is extremely
difficult  to exploit. Although  the  property  tax is  ubiquicous--virtually  all
market economy developing countries assign a  property tax  to municipal
government--it  generates  little  revenue. Property  taxes  account  for  an average
of only 1.3% of total public sector tax revenues  in developing  countries,
according  to the IMF s most recent  survey.  As shown in Annex Figure  2, it
t:rpically  accounts for less than 20% of  r'-nicipal  recurrent revenues in
developing  countries.
burden  on a base that is inelastic  in supply. The  property  tax  performs  well
on these  grounds,  relative  to the  alternatives. Land is considered  perfectly
inelastic  in supply.  In the  short  run,  buildings  are  also supply-inelastic.  In
the  long run,  owners  of buildings  can  iespond  to a tax increase  by curtailing
investment  in  new  structure,  shifting  resources  from  real  property  to  other  forms
of investment.  Aut the  extent  of such supply  responses  is arguably  less than
results from equivalent  levels  of taxation  on central taxes on income,  or
manufacturing,  or  from  implicit  tay-e-s  on  the  financial  sector.  Inefficient  supply
responses  are  also  reduced  to  the  .-xtent  the  property  tax  functions  as  a  benefit
tax: if individual  tax liabili-.ies  match the distribution  of tax-financed
benefits,  there  is  no incidence  to  avoid.
i/  In principle,  local surcharges  on central  government  taxes  would be an
attractive  means  of financing  municipal  government,  as they  would  combine  the
benefits  of local  control  over  local  revenue  levels  with  the  berfits of  central
government  tax administration.  Such surcharges  are common  i  the industrial
countries.  Because  of  the  narrow  coverage  of  central  direct  taxes  (chiefly  income
and  payroll) and  the  consequent  heavy  reliance of  developing countries'
governments  on indirect  taxes,  it  would  be difficult  to  devise  a surcharge  that
effectively  confronted  local  taxpayers  with local  service  costs.-4-
1.15  The  ostenasible  reason  for  this  poor  performance  would  appear  to  be  at
least  partly  technical.  The  quality  of  property  tax administration  in  developing
countries  is  so  poor  that  dramatic  increases  in  revenue  would  result  simply  from
achieving  comprehensive  coverage  and  reasonable  levels  of  collection  efficiency.
Misguided  policy  would  also  appear  to  be  at  fault:  nominal  tex  rates  are  low  and
the  b;uoyancy  of the  tax  is  held  hostage  to the  timing  of general  revaluations.
1.16  Underlying  poor  administration  and  low  rates,  however,  are  political
liabilities  inherent  in  the  property  tax.  From  a political  standpo.nt,  the
effectiveness  of  the  property  tax  in  confronting  taxpayers  with  the  costs  of
municipal  services  is  no virtue.  Central  governments--which  exercise  veto  power
over  property  tax  policy  and  frequently  are  responsible  for  its  administration-
-are  reluctant  to  allow  the  tax  to  be  exploited  effectively.  Local  governments
prefer  to  rely  on  less  politically  vulnerable  revenue  sources,  where  they  are
available.  Sustainable  property  tax  reform  t,Lerefore  often  requires  that  these
underlying  constraints  be  addreqsed--by  reducing  central  controls  and  altering
the  structure  of  local  finance.
1.17  The  remainder  of thif,  report  consists  of  four  parts. Chapter  2  and
Chapter  3  address  the  policy  and  edministrat.ve  eonstrair-ts  on  the  property  tax.
Chapter  4  discusses  institutior.l  issues.  The  final  chapter  discusses  strategies
for  reform  and  the  steps  required  to  address  these  underlying  constraints  on
performance  of  the  tax.II. EOLIJCy  TAREIS
2.1  The low  yield  of the  property  tax  is,  in on immediate  serse,  the
combined  result  of  inappropriate  policy  and  poor  tax  administration.  To  achieve
a stustained  increase  in  yields,  both  targets  generally  have  tc.  be addressed.
While  rate  increases  offer  tlis  prospect  of  quick  revenue  increases,  taken  alone
they  exaggerate  the  inequities  in  the  iLicidence  of  t.e  tax:  an  increase  in  the
effective  tax  rate  places  the  burden  of  the  increase  on  those  few  idiviouals
whose  properties  are  on  the  tax  rolls,  accurately  valtued,  and  from  whom  taxes
are  actually  collectid.
2.2  Improvements  in  administration,  on  the  other  hand,  offer  the  prospect
of  improving  fairness,  but  they  do  not  necessarily  result  in  significant  yields.
Improvements  in  the  comprehensiveness  of tax  rolls,  the  accuracy  of  property
information,  and  the  efficiency  of  collection  do  raise  revenue  by increasing  the
burden  on those  who currently  underpay. If nominal  tax rates  rem.Ain  low,
however,  yields  will  remain  trivial.  Under  these  conditions,  the  property  tax-
-although  aquitably  administered--may  not  produce  enough  revenue  to  be  worth
collecting.
A. Raising  the  Effective  Rate
2.3  Effective  tax  rates,  as  measured  by  the  absolute  level  of  individual
tax  liabilities,  tend  to  be  extremely  low  in  developing  country  cities.  This
is  the  combined  effect  of  two  distinct  policy  decisions:  the  level  of  nominal
rates  and  the  timing  of  general  revaluctions.
2.4  Reduce  Gentral  Controls  over  Rates.  In  principle,  there  is  no  "right"
level  of  property  taxation.  If  the  property  tax  is  functioning  as  a  price  for
municipal  servicas,  the "right"  level is the level that reflects  local
preferences.  But  central  government  restrictions  on  tax  rates  can  introduce  a
bias  against  higher  rates,  As central  government  derives  no  revenue  from  tb
tax,  it  has  no direct  financial  inter_st  in  higher  yields. This  calculation
is  reflected  in  the  extremely  low  effective  rates  mandated  by  central  governments
in,  for  example,  Indonesia  (where  the  combination  of a tax  rate  at 0.5%  of
capital  value  and  an  assessment  ratio  of  20%  yields  an  effective  tax  rate  of
0.1%)  ard4  the  Philippines  'where  central  government  legislation  fixes  a  maximum
tax  rate  of  1%  to  1.5%  of  capital  value  but  mandates  assessment  i:atios  that  can
reduce  the  net  tax  rate  to  as  low  as  0.1%).
2.5  Index  Valuations.  Exc3ssive  standards  can  introduce  a bias  against
timely  revaluations.  Although  property  prices  are  often  extremely  buoyant  in
developing  countries,  revaluations  are  required  if  these  are  to  be  reflected  in
tax  assessments.  The  traditional  pproach  to  revaluation  is  to  rely  on  periodic
field  surveys,  on a  schedule  determined  by central  government. This  practice
is  the  relic  of a preinflationary  age,  when  property  prices  were  relatively
stable,  and  field  inspections  served  as  a  means  of  updating  information  on  new
construction,  as  well  as  adjusting  prices.  Under  inflationary  conditions,  it
5/  The  counterargument--that  central  government  must  control  all  taxation  to
execute  national  fiscal  policy-  -is  sparious.  The  level  of  property  taxation  in
developing  countries  is  too  small  to  be  a  significant  element  in  fiscal  policy.-6-
results  in  a rapid  real  decline  in  assessed  values:  a 15%  annual  inflation  rate
reduces  the real value of an assessment  by half in five years.  Failure to
revalue  during  periods  of inflation  is often  self-perpetuating:  as valuations
fall in real terms,  taxpayers  become accustomed  to low effective  levels  of
taxation;  as  he gap between tax valuations  and market values widens, the
political  costs of abruptly  revaluing  to market levels increases,  prompting
further  delays. (In  principle,  declining  real  valuations  can  be  offset  by  annual
increases  in  nominal  tax  rates,  the political  courage  to  do  so  is  rarely
observed.)
2.6  Countries  familiar  with  inflation  have  addressed  this  problem  through
indexation.  'While  indexing,  over  time,  tends  to  yield  less  accurate  valuations
than field  inspection,  the  amounts  involved  are small  enough  that  the loss in
fairness  is  well  justified  by the  gain  in  buoyancy. The  degree  of  sophistication
used in indexing  valuations  varies.  In U.S. jurisdictions,  for example,  an
attempt is made to base the indices on the rate of  increase  in land and
construction  costs  within  the  taxing  jurisdiction.  In  Colombia,  similarly,  the
index  is (in  principle)  to  be based  on the  results  of an  annual  property  survey.
Other jurisdictions  are less meticulous.  In Tabasco,  Mexico, the index is
derived  from  a  national  consumer  price  index. In  Brazil,  no attempt  is  made  to
link  the  rate  of indexation  to  property  prices,  or even  to  general  increases  in
the cost of living.  In effect,  the adjustment  factor  functions  as both an
inflation  index  and a nominal  tax  rate.f
B.  Broadening  the  Base
2.7  Broadening  the definition  of what is taxable  can also increase  the
yield  of the tax.  Exemptions  and favorable  treatment  for  particular  types  of
property  can  remove  significant  contributors  from the  property  tax  base.  The
ostensible  objective  of these  policies  is to promote  a variety  of apparently
distributional  or allocative  objectives--to  shift  the tax burden  onto higher
income  groups,  or to influence  investment  decisions.  The validity  of these
objectives  is  oeten  questionable-  -particularly  when  local  government  is  pursuing
them-  -and  their  effectiveness  is limited.
Reduce  Tax  Rate Progressivity
2.8  Progressive  tax  rates-  -that  is,  rates  that  are  higher  for  higher-valued
property--are  common in developing  countries.  The tax rate on residential
property  in  Calcutta  ranges  from  11%  of  annual  rental  value  (ARV)  for  properties
valued  at less  than  Rs. 600 to 40% of  ARV on properties  with values  exceeding
Rs.  18,000. In  the  Philippines,  similarly,  centrally  mandated  assessment  ratios
introduce  a strong  element  of progressivity  into the  property  tax structure:
residential  properties  with a market  value  of less  than  30,000  pesos  are to  be
taxed  at 15%  of their  value;  properties  worth  over  500,000  pesos  are  to  be taxed
at 80%  of value.
jf  Mayors may make these  adjustments  unilaterally,  provided  the percentage
increase  does  not  exceed  the  official  inflation  index  for  treasury  bonds. Higher
adjustments  merely  require  the  approval  of the  municipal  council.-7-
2.9  Progressivity  in  the  form  of  exemptions  for  low  value  property  is  also
common. In  Karachi,  properties  with a rental  value  of less  than  Rs. 600 ($28)
are exempt; in Rio, properties  with a tax liability  of less than $3.90 are
exempt.  Both Rio and Karachi  have a de facto  policy  of exempting  squatter
settlements.
2.10  The intent  of these  policies  is  apparently  to  shift  a  greater  share  of
the  cost  of  municipal  services  onto  those  with  greater  capacity  to  pay. Whether
the  property  tax  is effective  in this  respect  is  debatable. Property  value  is
an imperfect  indicator  of  a  taxpayer's  net  wealth  or  income,  particular 1v if  part
of the  incidence  of the tax  is  passed  from  the  owner  onto  his tenants.v'  It is
also  not  clear  that--effective  or  not--local  government  should  be  concerned  with
what  are fundamentally  distributional  issues.
2.11  While modest degrees  of progressivity  are probably  harmless,  high
degrees  of  progressivity  can  have  adverse  effects  on  yields:  they  induce  evasion
at the  upper end of the  value scale,  while  reducing  the tax yield from low
income  properties  to a level that is not worth collecting.  Calcutta's  tax
structure,  for example,  implies  a tax rate  on high value commercial  property
equal  to 60% of annual  rental  value--a  rate  high enough  to prompt  the  bribery
attempts  and  spurious  legal  challenges  that  plague  Calcutta's  tax  system. At
the opposite extreme, the Philippines'  15% assessment  ratio on low value
property,  combined  with the 1.5% ceiling  on the nominal tax rate,  yields  an
effective  tax  rate of less  than one-tenth  of one  percent--and  a  tax  bill that
is  not  worth  the  costs  of collection.F
2.12  Reduce  Sectoral  Differentiation.  Tax rate structures  in developing
countries frequently  differentiate  among different land uses.  Residential
property  Ls taxed  at a lower  rate than  industrial  and  commercial  property,  and
owner-occupied  residential  property is taxed at a  lower rate than renter-
occupied. Vacant  land  is either  exempted  or surcharged.
2.13  The  ostensible  purpose  of  such  differentiation  is,  again,  to  shift  the
burden  of the tax  onto  those  better  able  to  pay, or to influence  investment  or
land  use  decisions.  Like  progressive  tax  structures,  these  sectoral  distinctions
are not effective  in achieving  their  ostensible  objectives,  but they  can  have
adverse  financial  or efficiency  costs.
.Z/  For  example,  a large  apartment  building  housing  low  income  households  would
be taxed  at a  higher  rate  than  single  family  home  housing  a  taxpayer  of  moderate
means.
I/  Outright  exemption  for low value property  may be, on the other hand,
justifiable--but  on  administrative  rather  than  distributional  grounds.  The  costs
of discovering,  valuing,  billing,  and  collecting  from  low  value  properties  may
not  be worth  the administrative  cost,  even at  uniform  tax  rates.  Where  small,
low  value  properties  constitute  a large  proportion  of  the  tax  base,  however,  tax
authorities  would  be  better  advised  to  adopt  extremely  simple  valuation  methods,
thus  bringing  them  into  the tax  system  at the  lowest  possible  cost.2.14  Virtually  all  developing  countries  impose  a  higher  rate  on industrial
and  commercial  property  than  on residential  property:  in  Calcutta,  the  rate  on
industrial  and  commercial  property  is 50%  higher  than  the  residential  rate.  In
Indonesia  (before  the  recent  reforms)  the  ratio  was 2.5:1.
2.15  The ubiquity  of these  surcharges  suggests  that politicians  have an
intuitive  appreciation  for  the  principle  of  shifting:  the  ability  of some  taxes
to be shifted  from the point  of collection  onto other factors  of production,
disguised  in the  form  of  higher  prices  or lower  factor  returns. Property  taxes
on  industrial and  commercial tax bases are  clearly susceptible  to  this
phenomenon. 2'  While this  makes this  part of the  property  tax base attractive
from  a political  standpoint,  it  undermines  the  rationale  for  the tax. Because
it  permits the taxpayers  in one jurisdiction  to export the costs of local
government  to  neighboring  areas,  it  undercuts  the  effectiveness  of the  property
tax  in serving  as a price  for  municipal  services.
2.16  Increase  Rate  on  Owner-occuDied  Residential  Property. Owner-occupied
residential  property,  in  contrast,  is  a  component  of the  base that  is  typically
undertaxed. While  rarely  exempted  outright,  owner-occupied  property  is  widely
given  favorable  tax  treatment.  Sometimes  this  is  explicit. In  Karachi,  the  tax
rate on owner-occupied  residential  property  is 25% lower than the rate on
equivalent  renter-occupied  property.  More often,  the favorable  treatment  is
implicit  in the  valuation  methodology  used for owner-occupied  properties. In
Amman,  rented  property  is  valued  on  the  basis  of  actual  rents,  but  owner-occupied
property  is valued  on the  basis  of a formula,  which is generally  conceded  to
yield  underestimates  of  value.
2.17  The policy rationale  for such treatment  is weak.  It is debatable
whether  owner  occupancy  is so inherently  desirable  as to merit favorable  tax
treatment. And its  equity  implications  are  probably  adverse. Owner  occupants
tend  to  have  higher  incomes  than  the  tenants  who  ultimately  bear the  burden  of
taxes  on rented residential  property.  Like the treatment  of industrial  and
commercial  property,  this loophole  is more likely  a response  to a political
calculation--a  tax imposed  on a visible flow of rents is more politically
cceptable  than  one  imposed  on the  intangible  flow  of  housing  benefits  that  owner
occupants  enjoy--but  it  has  no economic  or distributional  justification.
2.18  Increase  Rate  n VacanLt  Land.  Vacant land is also a  frequently
undertaxed  component  of  the  tax  base  -- particularly  in  Anglophone  Africa  and  some
Islamic  countries. Vacant  land is completely  exempt  from the  property  tax in
Onitsha,  Nigeria,  for  example. In  Jordan,  vacant  '.and  is  taxed  at  0.04%  of the
_/  The extent  to which the incidence  of a property  tax on industrial  and
commercial  property  can  be shifted  will  vary according  to the  characteristics
of the  business.  Where  the  tax is imposed  on producers  of tradable  goods  that
dominate  the  national  market,  much  of  the  incidence  will  be shifted  forward  onto
consumers  in other jurisdictions.  If the  business  produces  tradables  that do
not  dominate  the  national  market,  the  incidence  will  be borne  in  the  short  term
by the  owner  but may have a wider  incidence  in the long  run. If the  business
produces  nontradables,  the incidence  will be shared  between  owners  and local
consumers.- 9 -
price  declared  when it  was last  sold--a  de facto  exemption  for  all  but  the  most
recently  sold  properties.
2.19  The  favorable treatment of vacant land has  several rationales.
Precolonial  Islamic  countries  traditionally  exempted  land  that  was  not  yielding
income  from  property  taxation,  a factor  that  may  still  be significant  in  Africa
and South  Asia,  as well as the  Middle  East.  The  view  of the  property  tax  as a
municipal  service  charge  is also  used to  justify  this  policy. By this  line  of
reasoning,  since  vacant  land  receives  no  services,  it  should  have  no liability.
2.20  Neither  of these  arguments  stands  up to scrutiny. Patches  of vacant
lanid  increase  the  costs  in infrastructure  that  must  bypass  them. The  value  of
vacant  land  represents  capitalized  income. The  balance  of arguments  therefore
favors  the inclusion  of  vacant  land in  the  property  tax  base.A
1Q/  The  opposite  treatment  of  vacant  land  is found  in  Latin  America,  where  land
is taxed  more heavily  if it is  vacant  than  if it is  built  upon.  In the  state
of Yucatan,  Mexico,  for  example,  the  rate  on vacant  land  is 2.5  times  the  rate
on built  property. In Rio, the  rate on vacant  land in the  wealthier  southern
zone of the city is 7% of market  value,  26 times  the  rate on built  property.
Such surcharges  on vacant land appear  to be designed  to discourage  so-called
speculation:  to induce  landowners  to  develop  property  they  would  otherwise  hold
vacant.  The logic  of this objective  is itself  suspect:  it is not clear that
there  is a public  interest  in forcing  landowners  to advance  the time  at which
they  commit  land  for  urban  use. But the  argument  is  moot:  there  is  no evidence
that  surcharges  on  vacant  land  have  any impact  on development  timing. Imposing
a  vacant  land  tax  does  not  change  the  relative  rate  of  return  on  alternative  uses
of a  given  land parcel--it  merely  reduces  the return  to development,  whenever
it  occurs.10  -
III.  ROEURAL  TARGETS
3.1  In  most  developing  countries,  property  tax  reform  cannot  be limited  to
policy.  Because  the  quality  of tax  administration  is  poor, the  burden  of the
tax  falls  haphazardly  on  those  unable  to exploit  its  weaknesses. Raising  rates
alone  would  exaggerate  these  inequities.  Reform  efforts  must therefore  address
problems  in  administration.
3.2  Figure 1 outlines  the steps involved  in the administration  of the
property  tax. Two characteristics  of these  sequences  deserve  emphasis.
3.3  First, the amount of revenue raised depends upon the cumulative
performance  of all five steps--the  proportion  of properties  discovered,  the
accuracy  of  valuations  or.  those  properties,  the  tax  rate,  the  proportion  of  bills
effectively  delivered,  and  the  proportion  of those  bills  that  are  paid. Failure
at one stage in administration  of the tax  can counteract  successes  at others.
This  has important  implications  for  the  design  of tax  reform  interventions.  To
ensure  that  reform  ultimately  results  in an increase  in  revenues,  the  scope  of
intervention--at  least at  the  diagnostic stage--must  be  comprehensive--
confronting  all five  steps  in  administr'9ti:  - thi -. x.
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3.5  The environment  of  property  taxation  is  more  difficult  in developing
nations  than  in  the  industrial  countries. The basic  data  on  which  the  property
tax is based is inaccessible  or unreliable.  Base maps on which property
discovery  and identification  would  be based  are  nonexistent. The  market  data- 11.  -
on which valuations  are based is unreliable,  as property  markets are driven
underground  by high transaction  taxes and rent controls.  Data on property
ownership  is inaccessible,  either  because ownership  is disputed,  or because
deeds  registries  are  unwilling  or  unable  to cooperate  with taxing  authorities.
The rapid  growth  of cities  in developing  countries  exacerbates  the  difficulty
of administering  the  property  tax,  as subdivisions  and  new  construction  must  be
constantly  discovered  and  incorporated  if  the  tax  base  is  to  reflect  the  physical
growth  of the  city.
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A.  Discovery  and Identification
3.7  The objective  of discovery  is to find  all the  properties  subject  to
taxation  and obtain the information  needed to impose  the tax.  Two basic
approaches  are  used:
(a)  self-declaration-  -where  the  taxpayer  is  induced  to  provide  the
information  to the  taxing  authority;  and
(b)  government  inventory--where  the  taxing  authority  obtains  the
information  in the  field.
3.8  Under  a  self-declaration  system,  all  taxpayers  are  legally  required  to
periodically  declare  the  property  they  own  to the  taxing  authority. The  virtue
of this approach  is that it is inexpensive. The taxpayer  has to do all the
discovery  work (and  part  of  the  valuation)  himself. But  it  is  rarely  successful.
Self-declaration  is  workab 1e only if  the  taxing  authority  is  able  to induce  the
cooperation  of taxpayers,  and this  has proven  difficult.- 12  -
3.9  Remnants  of self-declaration  systems  still exist in Indonesia,  the
PhilLppines,  and some Indian  cities.  (Calcutta  is one.)  Turkey  and Peru are
among  the  few  countries  that  still  rely  entirely  on it.  There,  property  owners
are  required  to  file  property  declarations  with  the  taxing  authority,  every  three
years.  Declarations  must also  be filed  when a property  changes  ownership,  or
when  a building  is  constructed  or improved.
3.10  On the declaration,  owners  must  provide  the information  required  to
determine  the  property's  value.  In  Turkey,  owners  must  provide  information  on
the location,  usage,  physical  measurements,  and characteristics  of land and
buildings.  Based  upon these  characteristics,  owners  must then calculate  the
-operty's  value,  using price factors  provided  by the taxing  authority.  (In
Turkey,  owners  have the option  or making  an estimate  below the  minimum  value,
but they  pay a penalty  if the  property  is subsequently  sold  for  more than its
estimated  value.)
3.11  The effectiveness  of the self-declaration  system  depends  upon the
cooperativeness  of taxpayers--on  the  willingness  of all  property  owners  to  file
full  and accurate  property  declarations--and  in  practice  its  difficult  to get
them  to  do  so. All  the  countries  using  the  self-declaration  system  rely,  to  some
degree,  on penalties  to induce  compliance.  The legal  penalties  for failing  to
declare  values,  or for  underdeclaring  them,  are often  severe. In Taiwan,  for
example,  the  taxing  authority  has the  right  to  acquire  any  taxable  property  at
its  declared  value. To  be effective,  however,  these  penalties  must  be credible.
But they  are  not credible  because  the  penalties  are rarely  imposed. As audits
are infrequent,  the  odds  of discovery  are  small.
3.12  Turkey--the  only country  reporting  even modest  success  with owner-
declaration--relies  upon a combination  of field  audits  and tax  clearances  to
enforce  compliance. The audits'  coverage  is reportedly  broad  enough  to raise
the odds of discovery  to credible  levels.  They are supplemented  by a tax
clearance  system--in  which  an owner  wishing  to sell  his  property  must obtain  a
clearance  from the taxing  authority  before  submitting  his application  to the
registrar  of  deeds. The  clearance  system,  while  effective  in  inducing  compliance
among  owners  who intend  to sell  their  property,  does not  affect  owners  who do
not anticipate  selling.
3.13  Use  SimRle.  Single  PurRose  Maps. The  limited  coverage  of formal  real
estate  transactions in  many  developing  countries, combined  with  the
administrative  difficulties  involved  in implementing  a tax clearance  system,
limit  the  applicability  of the  Turkish  experience to  other  countries.
3.14  By far  the  most  common  approach  to  discovery  is the  inventory  system,
where  the  taxing  authority  staff  goes  into  the  field  to  obtain  the  data  required
to  administer  the  tax. In  effect,  inventory  systems  are  equivalent  to  100%  audit
under an owner-declaration  system.  The virtue  of this approach  is that it
permits  a field  verification. The drawback  is its  cost.
3.15  From  the  outset, an  inventory system requires a  geographical
referencing  system  to ensure that all properties  are found and assigned  an
ineradicable  identification  code.  In  industrial  countries, this is not
difficult. Parcel  maps  are  normally  available,  either  with  the  taxing  authority- 13
or  with  another  agency  of  government.  Even  where  they  are  not  (for  example,  in
the United  Kingdom),  a fall-back  option  is available:  street  maps  with a
functioning  street  address  system.
3.16  In  developing  countries,  none  of  these  can  be  relied  upon.  Some  parcel
maps  may exist,  but their  coverage  will  be limited  to higher  income  areas.
Street  maps  may  exist  for  lower  income  areas,  but  they  do  not  a  provide  a  basis
for  discovering  properties  not  visible  from  the  street.  And  street  maps  fail
to  provide  a  foolproof  identification  system.  Systematic  house  numbering  systems
cannot  be  relied  upon  in  most  developing  country  cities.
3.17  Many  developing  countries--particularly  in  former  British  colonies--
do not  use map-based  geographical  referencing  systems. Cities  as large  as
Calcutta,  Karachi,  and  Ibadan  simply  divide  their  territory  into  zones,  assign
each  zone  to  an  inspector,  and  assign  him  responsibility  for  discovering  all
taxable  property  in  his  jurisdiction.  To  provide  the  unique  identifier,  a tax
identification  number  is  painted  directly  onto  each  building.
3.18  In Calcutta  and Karachi,  the taxing  authorities  claim  that  this
approach  works,  but  the  claim  is  difficult  to  verify.  The  system  places  much
faith  in  the  honesty  of  the  inspectors--and  in  the  willingness  of  taxpayers  not
to  paint  over  their  tax  identification  numbers. In  some  cases  this  faith  is
clearly  misplaced;  in  Ibadan,  Nigeria,  so  many  taxpayers  have  painted  over  their
tax  identification  numbers  that  most  tax  bills  are  undeliverable.
3.19  Some  form  of  map  that  identifies  parcel  boundaries  therefore  appears
necessary  to  ensure  complete  coverage  and  ineradicable  identification.  But  there
are  many  standards  of mapping--variants  in  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of
information  to be mapped,  and widely  differing  costs  associated  with the
different  options.  As  maps  can  be  major  expense  of  starting  up,  the  costs  and
benefits  of  different  options  need  to  evaluated  carefully.
3.20  The  standards  required  of  a  property  tax  map  are  modest.  The  map  must
simply  enable  the  taxing  authority  to  account  for  all  the  properties  and  identify
each  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  eradicated  by  the  taxpayer.  In  principle,  these
basic  requirements  can  be  made  with  a  map  that  is  neither  accurate  in  terms  of
scale,  nor  complete  in the  sense  of including  the  entire  boundaries  of each
parcel.  As  long  as  the  map  demarcates  the  point  at  which  each  parcel's  boundary
intersects  the  street--and  all  parcels  front  on  a  public  street--this  approach
meets  the requirement  of  comprehensiveness  and  ineradicability.
3.21  This  approach  is  uncommon--in  part,  one  suspects,  because  decisions
about  mapping  standards  are  made  by  surveyors  who  have  professional  standards
to  uphold.  The  case  for  adding  one  characteristic--the  boundary  of  the  entire
parcel--is,  however,  fairly  persuasive.  By  mapping  the  whole  parcel,  the  taxing
authority  can  ensure  that  all  the  land  is  accounted  for  and  can  obtain  data  on
the  land  area  of  each  parcel,  for  later  use  in  determining  value.
3.22  Parcel  boundaries  need  not  be  mapped  with  precision,  however. The
standards  of  accuracy  that  would  apply  to  a  legal  demarcation  of  boundaries  are
inappropriate  to  a  tax  map. A  tax  map  does  not  constitute  recognition  of  a  legal
claim  to  property  ownership.  Precise  boundaries  therefore  do  not  need  to  be
determined  on  the  ground,  nor  accurately  represented  to  scale  on  a  map.- 14 -
3.23  This imprecision  can  significantly  reduce  mapping  costs. Accuracy  is
expensive. Where  maps are  based  on aerial  photographs,  for  example,  the  costs
of obtaining  the  photography  and supplementary  field  data  are relatively  low;
the point of cost-inflection  is orthogonal  ra_-¢Lfication.A'  While adding to
costs,  such refinements  have few  benefits  from  a fiscal  standpoint.
3.24  Tax reform  projects  should  also  avoid  attempts  to  link  up with other
geographical  information  gathering  efforts. While  a major  tax  mapping  project
would  seem  to  be an  opportunity  to  address  disputed  claims  to  property  ownership,
the  benefits  of linking  legal  and  fiscal  cadastre  are  overstated.  Adding  a  legal
component  to  a  tax  mapping  exercise  is  expensive.  Because  the  standards  required
for  titling  are  high,  the  marginal  cost  of  adding  a legal  component  to  a fiscal
cadastre  is  significant.  More  importantly,  the  pace  of tax  mapping  is  different
from that of title adjudication.  To impose  a  property tax, comprehensive
coverage is required.  As no benefits can be reaped  until the process is
completed,  speed  is important. In the  adjudication  and demarcation  of title,
by contrast,  each owner  derives  the  benefit  of clear  title  as he receives  it.
The  process  of legal  titling  can therefore  justifiably  proceed  at a slow  pace.
Linking  the  fiscal  and  legal  cadastre,  however,  condemns  the  former  to the  pace
of the  latter.
B.  Yaluation
nefining  Value
3.25  Use  the  Definition  that  ExDloits  the  Best  Market  Data. In  a  completely
unconstrained  situation,  the  first  valuation  issue  would  be how to denominate
value.  Property  value  can  be denominated  in two  ways:  either  on the  basis  of
the  rent  a  property  would  be expected  to  yield  (its  annual  rental  value  or ARV)
or according  to its  expected  sales  prica (te.'med  capital  or market  value).
3.26  Both definitions  are  widely  used.  The  choice  of a system  is  largely
a reflection  of historical  association. 'he United  Kingdom  and France  have
traditionally  valued  property  on the  basis  of rental  value;  in general,  their
one-time  colonies  in  Africa  and  Asia  do so.  Countries  influenced  by the  United
States--the  Philippines,  Liberia,  and  most of Latin  America--follow  the  U.S.
practice  and define  value on the  basis of capital  value.  The capital  value
definition  is also  used in  most  of northern  Europe--Germany,  the  Netherlands--
and in  Japan,  Turkey,  and Indonesia.  (Table  2)
3.27  In  part,  this  is  a  policy  issue,  as it  influences  distribution  of the
burden  of the tax.  Although  both capital  value  and rental  value reflect  the
income  to  be derived  from  a  property,  their  distributional  implications  differ.
ARV reflects  the income  from a property  In Its current use.  Capital  value
reflects  the  market's  assessment  of the  income  to  be derived  from  a property  in
the  future,  Includlng  Income  generated  by more Intensive  use  of the  property.
As a  result,  the  capital  value  definition  will  tend  to  place  a  higher  proportion
II/  That is,  correcting  for  distortions  caused  by the  fact  that  all  points  on
a photo  are  not  at right  angles  to the  lens  of the  camera.- 15 -
Table  2:  DEFINITIONS  OF VALUE  AND LIABILITY
SELECTED  COUNRIES
Annual  rental  value  Capital  value
owner  occupant  owner  cccupant




France  France***  Japan
Spain  Germany
Cote d'Ivoire  United  States****
Indonesia
Liberia****
*  Primary  liability  rests  with owner;  secondary  liability with
occupants.
**  Calcutta.  Under new law, tenant is liable for the difference
between tax owed on rent-controlled  base and tax owed on market
base.
French "land  and building  tax" (taxe  fonciere  sur les  proprietes
baties)  is imposed  on owner;  "property  tax" (taxe  d'habitation)  is
imposed on occupant. Both taxes are imposed on the basis of
estimated  annual  rental  value (ARV).
;  ****  Legal  liability  rests  with  the  property  itself  (ad  rem);  enforcement
directed  at owner.
of the  property  tax  burden  on "underused  property"--vacant  land  or built-upon
properties  that the  market  perceives  as ripe for  conversion  to more intensive
use.
3.28  In  practice,  the  economic  consequences  of the  two  definitions  are  not
so different  as theory  would  suggest. In  adapting  to  the  limitations  on  market
data for  various  classes  of prcperty,  valuers  from  one system  borrow  liberally
from the  techniques  of the  opposite  camp.  In ARV systems,  classes  of property
for which no rental market exists are valued on a capital  basis and then
converted  to rental  value using a capitalization  factor.  In capital  value
systems,  similarly,  rental  income  is  capitalized  to yield  a capital  value for
classes  of  property  for  which  other  methods  of determining  capital  value  cannot
be used.
3.29  This  suggests  that  political  credibility and  administrative
feasibility--rather  than  the  more abstract  economic  arguments--  should  be the
overriding  consideration  in choosing  a definition  of value.  Where  renting  is- 16 -
the most common form of tenure,  and rental  values  are well known and easily
accessible  to  the  taxing  authority,  ARV  may  be  tLe  most  appropriate  way  to  define
value.  Where  owner  occupancy  is the  more common  tenure  form--and  particularly
where  an  active  real  estate  market  exists-  -capital  value  may  be  more  appropriate.
CalculYatingValme
3.30  In reforming  property  taxation,  the main issue to be addressed  in
valuation  is  not how  value  should  be denominated  but  how it  should  actually  be
derived.  Here  again,  procedural  choices  can  make  the  difference  between  a  system
that  delivers  fair,  defensible  valuations  at reasonable  cost,  and  one  that  does
not.
3.31  The  purpose  of  tax  valuation  is  to  provide  a  basis  for  distributing  the
burden  of the  property  tax. In  considering  standards  and  options  for  valuation,
it is important  to distinguish  tax  valuation from the  valuation  governments
undertake  when  they  intend  to  purchase  a  property  outright. In  the  latter  case,
a high  standard  of accuracy  is  required:  the  valuation  must  produce  an  absolute
value  in  current  market  terms,  as  the  amount  changing  hands  will  equal  the  entire
value  of the  asset. Valuation  for  tax  purposes,  in  contrast, requires  only  a
determination  of the relative  value of properties  at a common  point in time.
As it involves  an exchange  equal  only to a small  percentage  of the  property's
value, accuracy  can be justifiably  traded off in the interest  of cost and
administ:ative  simplicity.
3.32  What is  essential  in  a tax  valuation  system  is objectivity--so  as to
reduce  opportunities  for dispute  or collusion---  and  a mechodology  appropriate
to local  skills  and  the  market  information  available  in the  local  jurisdiction.
3.33  For  Common Tvies  of ProRertv. Use  Mass Appraisal.  There are
fundamentally  two approaches  to valuation.  The first  relies  on direct  market
information about  the  property being  valued.  The  sesond depends on
extrapolation,  by formula,  from  a sample  of properties;  a practice  termed  mass
appraisal.
3.34  The  direct  market  information  approach  is  chiefly  ised  in  ARV  countries
in Africa  and South  Asia--the  one-time  colonies  of France  and Britain.  Mass
appraisal  is used in both capital  value countries---Brazil,  Mexico, and the
Philippines,  among others--and  to value owner-occupied  properties in ARV
countries.  Some ARV jurisdictions--Anambra  and Oyo states in iiigeria,  for
example--use  mass appraisal  systems  to value  both renter-  and owner-occupied
property.
3.35  Where it  can  be used,  the  direct  market  d-ta  approach  is  potentially
more accurate  than  mass appraisal. (As  an indicator  of market  value,  nothing
beats  the  real  thing.) But in  practice  the  reverse  is true. The  direct  market
data  approach  fails  the  test  of objectivity,  and  the  absence  of  a  formula-driven
basis  for  valuation  leaves  the  valuer  vulnerable  to  bribery.
3.36  The Calcutta  case is illustrative.  There  the  valuer  is instructed  to
value  rental  property  on  the  basis  of  actual  rents,  and  he is  authorized  to  seek
rent information--including  rent receipts--from  the occupants.  Occupants,- 17  -
however,  routinely  collude  with  landlords  to  understate  rents,  fabricating  false
receipts. The  valuer  then  has  two  choices:  he  can  accept  a declaration  he  knows
to  be false,  or he can  make a  counterproposal.  While  the law  gives  the  valuer
the authority  to  propose  his own  estimate  of a property's  rental  value--if  ite
disbelieves  the  rental evidence provided to him--the incentive structure
discourages this.  In  the absence of  a  credible basis for preparing a
counterproposal,  a  valuer  is in a poor  position  to defend  a  higher  valuation.
Faced  with the  prospect  of lengthy  court  battles,  local  authorities  prefer  to
negotiate  valuation  down to a level  satisfactory  to taxpayers.  Reliance  on
direct  market  data  therefore  yields  a  pattern  of  undervaluation;  the  disparities
between  actual  rents  and  reported  rents  reflecting  the  skills  and  rewards  of  the
two  negotiating  parties.
3.37  A  few  ARV  countries  have  found  solutions  to  this  problem,  by  exploiting
alternative  sources  of accurate  rental  information  or providing  landlords  or
tenants  with incentives  to  provide  accurate  data. In  Jordan  and  Cote  d'Ivoi7e,
registered  rental  contracts  are  used  as  the  basis  for  determining  actual  rents.
(In  these  countries,  government  agencies  register  rental  contracts,  as  a means
of  providing  an  official  imprimatur  to  private  agreements.)  As the  landlord  and
tenant  have  a financial  interest  in  recording  their  agreement  accurately,  these
contracts  serve as an reliable  source  of rental  data.  But the coverage  of
legally  registered  rental  agreements  is  limited. Even  in  Amman  and  Abidjan,  the
majority  of rental &greements  take the form of undocumented  understandings
between  landlord  and  tenant. In  Jordan,  the  government  also  employs  the  income
tax  law to  provide  tenants  with an incentive  to reveal  accurate  rents  directly
to  the  valuer:  rent  payments  are  deductible  from  the  personal  income  tax. Again,
the limited  coverage  of the  personal  income  tax  system  limits  the  coverage  of
this  enforcement  technique.
3.38  Direct market information  has a second limitation,  in that it is
applicable  only to properties  on the market.  As a result,  its use in ARV
countries is limited to renter-occupied  property. It has no application  in
countries  valuing  on the  basis  of capital  value:  as only a small  propo.tion  of
properties  are  actually  sold in  any  given  year,  few  direct  market  observations
of capital  value  are  e-ier  available  at any  given  time. 2
3.39  The  more  common  approach  to  valuation  is  mass  appraisal.  Valuation  by
mass  appraisal  is  accomplished  in three  steps:
(a)  First,  a sample  of recent  property  transactions  (sales  or
rents) or construction  data is analyzed to identify  the
physical  characteristics  that  appear  to  determine  a  property's
value;
(b)  The  contribution  of  each  of  the  prircipal  determinants  of  value
is  then  quantified  and  reduced  to  a  formula  (or  more  commonly,
a table);
12./  Some cases  also exist  in  which  property  sales  are  used as the  basis for
valuations.  In the  State  of Tabasco,  Mexico,  property  is revalued  only  when it
is  sold,  and it is then  valued  at the  reported  sales  price.- 18  -
(c)  This formula  is then  applied  to information  on the  physical
characteristics  of each property  in the  jurisdicrion's  tax
base,  to yield  individual  valuations.
3.40  In principle,  this approach  avoids  the worst aspects  of the direct
market information  method.  First,  it is not dependent  upon the honesty of
taxpayers:  the  physical  characteristics  of property  can  be seen and  measured.
It is also less  vulnerable  to  valuer  corruption:  the  use of a formula  reduces
valuer  discretion. And it can  be applied  to both owner-  and renter-occupied
property.
3.41  In designing  a method  for deriving  valuations,  two  problems  must be
confronted:
(a)  how to  get  a basic  core  of reliable  market  information;  and
(b)  how to extrapolate  from this  core  of market  data to produce
defensible  valuations  for  all  properties  in the  tax  base.
Address  Data  Constraints
3.42  Use Construction  Cost Data to Value  Buildings. In general,  capital
value  countries  address  the  data-constraint  problem  by limiting  their  reliance
on  sales  data  to  the  valuation  of land. Buildings  are  valued  separately,  using
data  from  a  source  that  is  considered  more  reliable:  the  construction  industry.
In the Philippines,  the taxing  authority  makes its estimates  of the cost of
construction  on the basis of materials  costs obtained  from lumberyards  and
hardware  stores,  and  on  standard  material-cost  to  labor-cost  ratios. In  Brazil,
taxing  authorities  rely  on cost  data  supplied  by local  contractors,  or compiled
from  professional  building  industry  journals.  These  sources  normally  distinguish
between the costs of construction  in different  exterior materials (brick,
concrete, stucco) and different  structure  types (detached  homes, apartment
buildings,  small  commercial  structures).
3.43  On  the  basis  of  this  data,  the  taxing  authority  estimates  the  cost,  per
square  foot,  of constructing  the  buildings  typical  of the area to be valued.
The  unit  costs  yielded  by this  approach,  while  objective,  are  an  extremely  crude
basis  on which to estimate  the  market  value of buildings. Most jurisdictions
tend to elaborate  on the methodology  by adding  variables:  data on type of
flooring,  plumbing  and  electrical  facilities,  subjective  estimates  of  the  quality
of repair,  the  state  of technological  obsolescence.  These  elaborations  do  not,
however,  improve  the  accuracy  of  valuations.  Although  these  adjustment  factors
can  dramatically  affect  a property's  valuation,  the  weight  assigned  to them is
not  generally  determined  by an analysis  of cost  or  market  responses.  Instead  it
reflects  the  deliberations  of  the  valuation  staff,  and  the  views  of  the  political
leaders  who must  ultimately  approve  the tables.-L'
12/  The  practice  in  developing  countr'es  suggests  that  this  is  not  an inherent
problem  in  mass  appraisal  systems.  In  the  United  States,  for  example,  statistical
analyses  are used to determine  with some precision  the contribution  of each
factor  to value.  But in developing  countries  this  opporturity  to improve  the
accuracy  and objectivity  of individual  valuations  is not  exploited.3.44  Use RLeal  Estate  AageL-  Informa  to  to Value Land.  In valuing land--
including  the  land  under  buildings--taxing  authorities  have no alternative  but
to  seek  evidence  from  the  property  market. In  capital  value  countries,  one  might
expect  to find  credible  property  market  data  reported  in  the  legal  documentation
accompanying  transfer  of ownership--the  contract  or the deed of sale.  Since
government  is  the  repository  of  deeds  of  sale,  this  might  be  thought  to  be easily
accessible.
3.45  Developing  countries'  property tax regulations  often reflect this
assumption. In Brazil,  the  state  agency  responsible  for  administering  a tax  on
property  taxation  as  well  as  government-licensed  registrars  of  deeds  are  required
to inform  the  valuer  of all  recent  transactions.  In the  Philippines,  the  same
obligation is  imposed on  deeds registrars,  and  on both  parties to  the
transaction.
3.46  But  official  cLata  is  unreliable.  With  startling  uniformity,  developing
countries impose high  taxes on  real estate transactions.  This prompts
transactors  to grossly  understate  actual  prices  in official  documentation. In
practice,  therefore,  taxing  authorities  tend  not to rely on official  sources.
Instead  they  constitute  valuation  commissions,  consisting  of real  estate  agents
and  major  property  owners,  who come  up  with  market  information  based  on their
professional  experience.
3.47  The  process  for  converting  individual  observations  into  a  standardized
table  parallels  the  one  used  in  estimating  the  unit  cost  of  buildings--with  the
same problems.  It starts  with a systematic  ordering  of data but then is
overloaded  with arbitrary  adjustment  factors. First,  estimates  of the  market
price of specific  parcels  in various  locations  in the  jurisdiction  are made.
These  are grouped  by neighborhood  and  divided  by their  respective  dimensions,
yielding  an estimate  of the  unit  value of land  by neighborhood. A variety  of
adjustment  factors  are then imposed.  In Brazil,  unit costs are adjusted  to
reflect the availability  of specific  public services  and the steepness  and
squareness  of the plot's  layout. Similar  adjustment  factors  are  used in the
Philippines. Again, there is no evidence  that the value attached  to these
adjustment  factors  is  based  on the  analysis  of market  conditions.
3.48  While  mass  appraisal  is  most  common  in  capital  values  countries,  it  is
also used in ARV countries,  particularlv  in the valuation  of owner-occupied
property. Like  the  procedure  used  in  capital  value  countries,  the  process  begins
with a survey  of properties. Individual  observations  of  current  rents  are  then
grouped  and  analyzed  to  yield  an estimate  of  prevailing  rents,  per  unit  of floor
area,  in  various  neighborhoods. The  extent  of further  elaboration  varies. In
Karachi  and  Lahore,  the  unit  cost  tables  simply  designate  a standard  value  per
room,  cross-classified  by  neighborhood.  The  tables  used  in  Jordan,  in  contrast,
define  a rental  value  per  square  meter  of floor  area,  cross  classified  by class
of municipality,  neighborhood  quality,  and  quality  of construction  materials.
The  process  used to derive  these  more  detailed  tables  is,  again,  obscure,  even
to the  valuers  using  them  In  Jordan,  the  most  recent  tables  were  developed  by
a  committee  set  up for  the  purpose  and  since  disbanded;  Ahmedabad  is  still  using
a table  of values  established  in the 1950s,  based  on deliberations  long since
forgotten.- 20 -
3.49  Use  Points  System  to  Value  Lowe-Value  PropRrty.  Some  taxing  authorities
dispense  with  any  attempt  to  reflect  market  conditions  in their  table  of  values
and  instead assign prices or  "points" arbitrarily to  specific property
characteristics.  In Ibadan,  Nigeria, for example, the tax on residential
buildings  made of corrugated  iron sheets  is a flat 50 kobo;  the tax on a mud
building  is 75  kobo,  plus  50  kobo  for  each  additional  floor. Taxes  on  commercial
buildings  are  assessed  on  the  basis  of  use  and  floor  area;  again  without  specific
reference  to  market  values. This  is  an  appropriate  system  for  valuing  low  value
property  (the  arbitrariness  is acceptable  because  the tax  rate is low)  and is
particularly  appropriate  if the  objective  is  to get  all  consumers  into  the  tax
net (even  if their  individual  contribution  is  negligible).
3.50  Perform  Individual  Valuations  on  Unique.  High  Value  Properties.  While
one mass appraisal  approach  is appropriate  for the  bulk of the  tax base, the
urban property  tax base will also include  unique, high value structures--
particularly  factories--for  which observable  rental  or sales  market  does not
exist,  and  mass appraisal  techniques  cannot  be applied. Instead,  more complex
valuation  methods--based  on capitalized  income,  or property-specific  estimates
of depreciated  replacement  cost--may  be required. As a small  number  of  such
structures  can  account  for  very large  share  of the  tax  base--sixty-three  such
buildings  in  Calcutta  account  for  74%  of  the  city's  assessed  value,  for  example-
-taxing  authorities  can  be  justified  in  using  more  sophisticated  methods  to  value
them.
3.51  Use Hvxothetical  Market Value to Value Rent Controlled  Frote_y.
Controls  on residential  rents  can dramatically  affect  the performance  of the
property  tax.  While their  impact  tends  to  be severest  in  ARV countries,  rent
controls  can  also  affect  performance  of the  tax  in  capital  value  countries:  by
reducing  expected  rental  income,  rent  control  can  ultimately  reduce  the  market
price  of renter-occupied  buildings.
3.52  How  severe  an impact  rent  control  has depends  upon the  specific  form
of the  controls,  the  nature  of  the  market's  response,  and  the  valuation  procedure
adopted  by the  taxing  authority.
3.53  In  much  of  South  Asia,  the  prevailing  rent  control  regime  freezes  rents
on existing  tenancies  at a  historical  date,  allowing  the  rents  on new  tenancies
to be set at "market"  levels  but then limiting  any subsequent  increases. If
observed  by the  market,  this  regime  would  slow the  rate  of increase  in rents--
relative  to uncontrolled  conditions--and  if observed  by the taxing  authority,
it  would  slow  the  growth  of assessed  values.
3.54  Rent control's  impact  on the growth  rate  of the tax  base is  not its
principal adverse effect, however.  A  taxing  authority can compensate  for
stagnation  in  its  tax  base  by increasing  its  tax  rate. The  problem,  rather,  is
that  rent  controls  distort  the  distribution  of  the  tax's  burden. Where  they  are
observed  by the  valuer,  rent  controls  constitute  a de facto  exemption  of older
properties  from  the  property  tax. This  shifts  the  burden  of financing  municipal- 21 -
government  onto more recently  constructed  structures,  in effect forcing  the
owners  or occupants  of newer structures  to subsidize  the municipal  services
provided  to older  ones.1V
3.55  It can  be argued  that,  as long  as owners  are liable,  valuations  must
be based  on controlled  rents  to be equit  ble;  because  rent controls  limit  the
revenues  derived  from  older  properties,  it  would  appear  that the tax  on these
properties  should  be proportionately  low.  The argument  is valid  only to the
extent that rent controls  are scrupulously  observed  by the market and tax
liabilities  fully  borne  by landlords. In  practice  neither  of these  conditions
prevails. The  widespread  use  of  key  money  and illegal  rent  agreements  suggests
that  any  relationship  between  the  rent  dictated  by law  and  actual  income  derived
from  property  is  coincidental.  And there  is  no guarantee--laws  to  the  contrary
notwithstanding--that  landlords  may  not  pass  the  burden  of  the  property  tax  onto
their  tenants.
3.56  This problem  is most prominent  in India,  where severe  forms  of rent
control  are  widespread  and  the  courts  have  been  most rigid  in requiring  taxing
authorities  to observe  it.  In a landmark  1983  decision,  India's  Supreme  Court
forced  Delhi  Corporation  to  abandon  its  traditional  practice  of  valuing  rented
property  on the basis of "actual"  rent,  ordering  the corporation  to instead
derive  its  valuations  from  rental  ceilings  fixed  in  the  city's  rent  control  act.
This decision--which  reduced Delhi's assessed valuation by  half--has had
repercussions  throughout  India.
3.57  Taxing  authorities  have  several  options  for  dealing  with  rent  control.
One, obviously,  would  be to eliminate  rent  control  itself. As a solution  to  a
problem of  property tax administration,  however, this response would be
disproportionate.  Rent control--whether  desirable  or not--is  a major  element
in a nation's  housing  policy.  For the property  tax, "rents"  are simply  an
indicator  used to determine  distribution  of the tax  burden.  Abolishing  rent
control  under these  conditions  would,  in effect,  be using a major change ir
housing  policy  to  address  a  relatively  minor  problem  in  local  tax  administration.
3.58  The approach to this problem used in the United Kingdom is more
promising.  Like  its  ex-colonies,  the  United  Kingdom has  widespread  rent  control
and--until  recently--valued  residential  property  on the  basis  of annual  rental
value. To avoid  the  inequities  resulting  from  this  approach,  rented  properties
are valued  not on the basis of controlled  rent,  but rather  on the basis of
J,/  The reverse  can also  happen,  depending  upon the  rent control  law  and the
way it is interpreted  by the  taxing  authority. In  Anambra  State,  Nigeria,  for
example, the  Rent  Control Edict fixes rents  on  the basis  of  physical
characteristics--a  maximum  amount  per room,  varied according  to dwelling  and
neighborhood  characteristics.  Rents  on  new  buildings,  as  well  as old  ones,  must
conform  to the  law.  Although  the  edict  is flouted  in the  housing  market,  it is
observed  by the  taxing  authority.  As a  result,  the  burden  of the  local  property
tax  falls  disproportionately  on  older  properties,  because  the  disparity  between
actual  rents  and  the  valuer's  estimate  is  wider  on  newer  properties  than  on  older
ones.- 22 -
"hypothetical  market  rent,"  which  is derived  from  an analysis  of rental  values
in  the  uncontrolled  segment  of the  market. (To  avoid  the  consequent  problem  of
landlords  paying  property  taxes  based  on  "market"  rents  when  their  actual  Incomes
reflect the controls, the tax is imposed  on occupants.)  A variant of this
approach  has been  under  consideration  in  Madras,  India. There,  in the  absence
of  an  officially  uncontrolled  market,  the  taxing  authority  was  proposing  to  base
its  mass appraisal  on a survey  of "actual  [that  is, illegal,  market]  rents."
The  proposal,  however,  has  been rejected  by the  state  government.
C.  Updating  ProDertXY  ILformation
3.59  The valuer's  job does not end once all the properties  have been
discovered  and assigned  values.  To ensure  that  property  records  continue  to
reflect  changes  in the tax  base,  discovery  and  valuation  must  be ongoing. The
more effective  this "maintenance"  function,  the  more buoyant  the tax  base and
the less the taxing  authority  must depend  on nominal tax rate increases  and
indexation  to  maintain  the  growth  of the tax  base.
3.60  Changes in the tax base are of two types.  First are changes in
property  characteristics.  New  properties  come  into  existence  through  subdivision
or  the  annexation  of  rural  areas. New  buildings  are  constructed  or  existing  ones
improved. To maintain  comprehensive  coverage  of the tax  base, these  physical
changes  must be incorporated  as they  occur.  Second  are changes  in ownership,
which  must  be captured  on an ongoing  basis  to ensure  the  collectibility  of the
tax.
3.61  Cross Reference to Update Data on Physical Characteristicgs  an
QOnershig.  All  developing  countries  use  a  combination  of  two  methods  to  discover
changes  in  the  physical  characteristics  of  the  tax  base  and  changes  in  ownership:
regular  field  surveys  and  cross  referencing.
3.62  In principle,  all the data needed  to update  the taxing  authority's
property  records  should  be  already  in  the  public  domain. The  entity  responsible
for  approving  subdivision  plans  should  be aware  of the  creation  of new  parcels
through  subdivision.  Data  on  new  construction  should  be  available  in  the  agency
that  issues  building  and  occupancy  permits. Changes  in  ownership  should  be  known
to  the entity char3ed with registering  deeds or titles.  Provided this
information  is accessible  to the  taxing  authority,  the  administrative  costs  of
tracking  these  changes  down independently  can,  in theory,  be eliminated.
3.63  Such cross referencing  is often mandated by regulation.  In the
Philippines,  surveyors  (private  or public)  are  required  to provide  the  taxing
authority  with  copies  of  approved  subdivision  plans  within  thirty  days  of their
receipt  from  the  Bureau  of  Lands. When  property  is  sold,  the  registrar  of deeds
is  required  to  provide  the  taxing  authority  with  a  copy  of  the  deed  of sale,  and
both the  purchaser  and the  seller  are required  to separately  notify  the  taxing
authority  within  sixty  days. In  the  case -P new  construction,  both  the  official
issuing  the  building  permit--generally  the  municipal  engineer--and  the  owner  are
required  to  notify  the  taxing  authority.- 23 -
3.64  Experience  with cross  referencing  is  mixed.  In  part this is  because
many of the  changes  in the  property  tax  base  occur  outside  the  system  of permit
and registrations:  land is subdivided  illegally,  buildings are constructed
without  permits;  squatters  establish  de facto  ownership. But  its  effectiveness
is  also  limited  by the  difficulty  of forcing  agencies  of  government  to  cooperate
with one  another. In  Pasay  City,  Philippines,  the  registrar  of deeds  has  never
provided  the  names  of new  purchasers  to the  taxing  authority--even  though  both
agencies  are  part  of the  municipal  government  and their  offices  are  across  the
hall from  each  other.
3.65  Where  cross  referencing  works,  it  works  by harnessing  the  taxpayer's
interest  in obtaining  something  from  the  government. Tax clearance  systems  do
this  most effectively. In a  tax  clearance  system,  the  taxpayer  is required  to
obtain  certification  from the taxing  authority  before  seeking  a subdivision
approval,  building  permit,  or registration  of  deed  from  the  relevant  government
agency.  The cooperating  agency is merely required  to act ar a policeman,
rejecting  applications  that have not been cleared;  the sense of urgency is
provided  by the  taxpayer.
3.66  Such a tax  clearance  system  functions  fairly  effectively  in Brazil.
Tax  clearances,  imposed  by the  public  works  department  as  a  condition  of  granting
an occupancy  permit,  serve  to  bring  new construction  to the  taxing  authority's
attention.  Tax clearances,  imDosed by cartorios (deeds registrars)  as a
condition  of deed  registration,  serve  to flag  changes  in ownership.
3.67  Taxpayers can also be  induced to voluntarily  supply information
directly  to the taxing  authority,  particularly  where it involves  changes  in
ownership.  Where  ownership  is  subject  to  dispute,  purchasers  will  register  their
property  with the taxing  authority  in an attempt  to strengthen  their  claim.-I'
Sellers,  similarly,  may  notify  the  taxing  authority  to  avoid  liability  for  taxes
on  property  they  no longer  own.
3.68  Cross  referencing  and  voluntary  compliance  do not eliminate  the  need
for site  visits,  however.  Proposed  subdivisions  or new construction--though
approved  by the  public  works  department--may  never  take  place  and  therefore  have
to be verified.  Subdivision  plans and building  permit  applications  may not
provide sufficient  information  to permit an in-office  valuation.  Voluntary
compliance  is  effective  only  in  bringing  changes  in  ownership  to the  assessor's
attention. As a  result,  cross  referencing,  even  where it  works,  serves  only  a
limited function--that  of bringing changes in the tax base to the taxing
authority's  attention.
3.69  To supplement  these  indirect  means  ef discovering  changes  in the  tax
base, taxing  authorities  routinely  rely on field  work by their  own staff,  who
regularly patrol  designated zones  of  their  municipalities,  noting  new
construction  and  evidence  of impending  subdivision  and  sales. In India,  where
reliance  on field  surveys  is greatest,  taxing  authorities  retain  large  staffs
1/  Registration  with the taxing authority  does not legally  constitute  a
recognition  by government  of  a taxpayer's  claim,  but in  the  absence  of contrary
evidence  it is often  accepted  as such  by the  courts.- 24 -
on  a  permanent  basis  solely  for  this  purpose. Calcutta  Corporation,  for  example,
maintains  a staff  of 768  field  surveyors. Bombay  employs  1,895.
D.  Billing  -and  Colec-Lon
3.70  Low  collection  efficiency  is a major  constraint  on the  yield of the
property  tax, and it can offset  any gains made from improving  discovery  and
valuation. The  available  data  suggests  that  typically  half of  current  property
taxes  are not paid in the  year in which they are  due.  In Amman,  Jordan, the
collection  ratio  is 62%; in Rio, 60%; in Calcutta,  55%.  Ibadan,  Nigeria,  has
the  lowest  collection  efficiency  among  the  cities  surveyed,  at 9%.iW
3.71  Success  at  collection  is  essentially  a  matter  of  information  management
and  leverage:  knowing  who  owes  what,  and  having  the  means  and  incentive  to  induce
them  to  pay. There  are  two  targets  for  reform:  (1)  the  legal  framework--defining
what  is  liable,  what  constitutes  notification,  and  what  penalties  may  be imposed;
and  (2) collection  administration:  managing the production  of bills, the
monitoring  of payments,  and the  pursuit  of delinquents.
The  Legal  Framework
3.72  Define  Owner  as Liable.  but  Define  OwnershiR  Broadly. An appropriate
legal  definition  of liability  and  notification  can  simplify  the  billing  function
and  increase  the  taxing  authority's  leverage  over  delinquents.  For  tax  purposes,
the  sole  objective  in  defining  tax  liability  is to  make the  tax  collectible--to
find a person  to whom the taxing  authority  can apply  sufficient  leverage  to
extract  the tax.  The first  decision  to be made is whether  to designate  the
owner  or the  occupant  as liable.
3.73  Most countries--both  developed  and developing--define  the property
owner,  rather  than the occupants,  as ultimately  liable  for the property  tax.
This  has two  administrative  virtues:
(a)  It reduces  the number  of individual  taxpayers,  because  only
one bill need be  issued for  structure housing multiple
occupants;  and
1§/ Data  on  property  tax  collections  often  are  not  organized  in  a  way  that  would
permit an accurate analysis of ccAlection  performance.  Some jurisdictions
(Onitsha)  combine  current  payments  and  payments  on arrears  (including  interest
and penalties),  overstating  the numerator.  Others  do not distinguish  current
liabilities  from liabilities  on arrears,  overstating  the denominator.  Some  do
not report  collections  on arrears  as part of property  tax  revenue  at all. In
Brazil, for instance,  payments  recovered  through lawsuits  are grouped with
receipts  from  other  fines.  Results  can  therefore  be misleading.  In  some Indian
cities  in particular,  high rates  of collections  on arrears  compensate  for low
collection  efficiency  on  current  account.  In  Calcutta,  for  example,  late  payments
comprise  45% of total  property  tax receipts--suggesting  that  most liabilities
are  paid,  eventually.- 25 -
(b)  It  exploits  one  of  the  few  administrative  benefits  of  property-
-its  immobility.  If the  tax  is  imposed  on occupants,  they  can
evade  by decamping. If the  owner leaves,  he sacrifices  the
use of  his property.
3.74  In  developing  countries,  however,  ownership  is  subject  to  dispute. In
much  of  Africa,  land  on the  urban  periphery  has  never  been  formally  adjudicated.
In Latin  America,  formerly  adjudicated  claims  are  disputed  because  of years  of
illegal  occupation.  Even  where  claims  to  ownership  are  not  disputed,  title  data
may  be inaccessible  to  the  taxing  authority. In the  Philippines,  title  records
are  o¶ganized  by claimant  and  date  of issue,  rendering  them  useless  to  a  valuer
who  knows  only the  location  of a given  property.
3.75  Taxing  authorities  have  addressed  this  problem  by  adopting  definitions
of ownership  that  effectively  absolve  the  taxing  authority  of  any  obligation  to
prove  legal  ownership. Such  definitions  enable  the  taxing  authority  to  exploit
the  leverage  that  comes  from  being  able  to  deprive  the  taxpayers  of the  benefit
of de facto ownership,  without obligating  the taxing  authority to meet an
impossible  standard  of  proof.
3.76  Two specific  legal  strategies  are  used.  (1)  In the Philippines  and
Liberia (and the United States),  the tax law defines  the proDerty  itself  as
liable  for  the  property  tax. Under  this  ad  rem  definition,  if  the  property  does
not  pay its  tax, it can  be seized  and sold--a  threat  intended  to bring  the  de
facto  owner  forward. (2)  In Latin  America,  sub-Saharan  Africa,  and  South  Asia,
the  strategy  entails  a  very  broad  ad  personam  definition.  In  Brazil  and  Nigeria,
the  owner  is defined  as liable,  but  ownership  may include  anyone  in  beneficial
occupation  of the  property.
3.77  Define Notification  as Delivering  the Bill to the Property.  An
'ownership"  definition  of  liability  also  requires  an  appropriate  legal  definition
of notification. The owner--unlike  the occupants--may  live  off the  premises.
If the  law requires  the  owner to  be notified  in person,  finding  the  owner  can
be a major  obstacle  to the imposition  of the  tax.  In  Abidjan,  for  example,  an
estimated  40% of tax bills are uncollectible  because  the owner's  address is
unknown. Amman  faces  a similar  problem  because  of the  large  number  of  property
owners  working  in  neighboring  countries.
3.78  Two  measures  can  address  this  problem. First  the  taxing  authority  can
be absolved  of the legal obligation  to personally  notify the taxpayer  as a
condition  of imposing  the  tax,  by defining  legal  notification  as delivery  of a
bill  to  the  taxable  property. In  Nigeria,  delivery  of a  tax  bill to  the  taxable
property--even  to the  extent  of pasting  it to the  door if  no person  is willing
to accept  receipt--constitutes  legal  notification.
3.79  Second, a  secondary level of  liability  can be  imposed upon the
occupants. Tenants  have the  virtue  of being  on site.  Their  tendency  to evade
taxes  by decamping  can  be addressed  by permitting  them to deduct  property  tax
payments  from  their  rents--an  arrangement  Lhat  takes  advantage  of  the  divergence
in  interests  between  landlords  and  tenants. (Such  arrangements  are  provided  for
in Lagos  and Calcutta.)- 26
3.80  Increase Penalties  .fr  Late Payment  Stiff penalties are also
essential  to  collection  enforcement.  Penalties  have  to  be set  up to  address  two
different  problems:  the  first  is  to get  people  to  pay  on time;  the  second  is  to
get them  to  pay  at all. To encourage  people  to  pay  on time,  interest  penaities
are  typically  imposed  on  payments  made  after  the  due  date. To  be effective,  the
rate  of  interest  has  to  be  high  enough  to  constitute  a  clear  financial  incentive.
If interest  rates  are  below  the  rate  a taxpayer  can  earn  on short  term  savings
deposits,  the  financially  astute  taxpayer  has an incentive  to  delay  payment  as
long  as  possible,  even  if  he  eventually  has  to  pay the  interest  charge. (Except
in countries  recently  overtaken  by inflation,  however,  these  cases  are rare.
In the  Philippines,  the  effective  annual  interest  rate  was 27%,  during  a  period
in  which  the  official  rate  paid  on  short  term  deposits  fluctuated  between  8%  and
22%. In  Ibadan  and  Onitsha,  the  effective  annual  rate  was 10%  per  mQnth,  during
a period  in  which  official  rates  on short  term  deposits  never  exceeded  10%  per
year.) Prompt  payment  is  particularly  critical  under  inflationary  conditions,
as delays  can  seriously  erode  the  real  value  of the  amount  received. Countries
with  permanent  inflation  have  managed  to  adapt. In  Recife,  Brazil,  late  payments
are  subject  to  a penalty  surcharge  of 20%. Both  the  principal  outstanding  and
the penalty surcharge  are then indexed  to inflation;  the amount due being
calculated  on the  day the  tax is  actually  paid.
3.81  Triage  Enforcement  against  Longstending  Delinquents. Interest  rate
penalties  are  effective  only  in speeding  up the  receipt  of tax  payments. They
are  not  effective  in  exLracting  payments  from  taxpayers  who  never  intend  to  pay
at all.  To reach  these  taxpayers  stronger  measures  are  required.
3.82  In  virtually  all  developing  countries,  taxing  authorities  are  legally
authorized  to  take  enforcement  actions  whose  consequences  would  far  outweigh  the
cost of paying  an outstanding  property  tax  bill.  In all five of the cities
identified  in Table  3, the taxing  authority  is  permitted  to seize  and sell  the
property  itself. In four  of the  five,  the  taxing  authority  is  also  permitted
to seize and sell the personal  effects of a delinquent  taxpayer,  using the
proceeds  to  pay  outstanding  taxes. Three  of  the  five  permit  the  taxing  authority
to pursue delinquents  through the court system, as debtors of the taxing
jurisdiction.
Table  3:  ENFORCEMENT  MEASURES.  SELECTED  CITIES
Maniia  Onitsha  Calcutta  Karachi  Rio
seize  and  sell:
personal  property  x  x  x  x
real  property  x  x  x  x  x
sue  for  debt  x  x  x
garnish  rents  x
3.83  These  penalties,  however,  also  impose  high  political  and  administrative
costs  on the taxing authority.  Politically,  the costs of  seizing one's- 27 -
constituents'  real  estate  or personal  effects  can  be high.  The  administrative
costs  of doing  so can  also  be disproportionate  to the  amount  of revenue  gained.
In Onitsha,  obtaining  a  distraint  order  requires  the  local  authority  to retain
a  lawyer  and  pursue  a case through  the  magistrate  courts--a  process  taking  at
least  six  months.  In Recife,  the treasurer  estimates  the legal  route  to take
five  years.
3.84  High profile penalties do, however, have a  salutary effect on
collection  performance--not  only on the immediate  target  but on taxpayers  in
general.  A  strong case  therefore exists for  applying these penalties
selectively--against  major  delinquents,  where  payoff  is likely  to be greatest
both in terms  of public  relations  and in tax  revenue.
3.85  Delhi, for example, followed this strategy.  There, the taxing
authority decided to  focus collection  efforts on the two hundred largest
delinquents--those  with liabilities  over  Rs. 10,000. Although  the  decision  to
concentrate  on  major  delinquents  reduced  the  number  of cases  to  about  5% of its
former  level, collections  doubled  from  Rs. 136.38  laks  to  Rs. 249.13  laks.
3.86  Use  Cross  Referencing  for  Enforcement.  Where  Administratively  Feasible.
Tactical  use of severe  penalties  should  be supplemented  by less costly  and
controversial  enforcement  mechanisms.  The  most  promising  of these  are  in  effect
quids  pro quo: arrangements  by which the taxing  authority  provides  something
valued  by the  taxpayer,  in  return  to  payment  of the  tax. While the  application
of  these enforcement  mechanisms tends to be  limited, the mechanisms are
relatively  inexpensive  to implement--both  politically  and  administratively.
3.87  The most obvious quid pro quo a  taxing  authority  can offer to a
property  tax  payer  is its  guarantee  of tenure  security. Clear  title  tends  to
be  highly  valued  in  developing  countries,  and  government's  position  as  repository
of claims to property ownership  would appear to give it a high degree  of
leverage.
3.88  In Brazil and Turkey, the exchange  of tenure for tax payment is
explicit.  In these countries,  registrars  of deeds are legally  forbidden  to
register  a deed  of  sale  unless  the  purchaser  can  demonstrate  that  all  back taxes
on the  property  have  been paid.  In the  Philippines,  the  enforcement  mechanism
is  passive:  outstanding  property  tax  liabilities  have  the  status  of  liens  against
title,  and--at  least in theory--they  can cloud title  and reduce  the  value of
property  for  purpose  of mortgage  or sale.
3.89  This form  of quid  pro  quo is  limited  in  its  scope,  however. Liens  or
tax clearances  cannot  be imposed  on properties  for which no title documents
exist.2'
IV  Ironically,  improvement  in tenure  security  can be harmful to collection
performance. In Lagos,  for example,  the most compliant  taxpayers  are owner-
occupants  with questionable  titles. Paying  property  taxes,  they  believe,  is a
means  of  strengthening  their  claim  to  ownership-  -a  belief  that  tends  to  be  denied
in law  but supported  by the  behavior  of adjudication  courts.- 28  -
3.90  Some countries  have experimented  with other types  of quids  pro quo.
In Brazil,  a property  tax clearance  is required  before  a company  can bid for
mun'cipal  contracts. Success  is  also  reported  in  using  tie-ins  with  utilities.
In Caracas,  electric  power is shut off for nonpayment  of property taxes,  a
penalty  that is reportedly  extremely  effective. There  is some  risk in linking
utility  service  to  property  tax  payment,  however. Onitsha,  Nigeria,  attempted
to  use  the  threat  of interrupted  water  service  as an  enforcement  mechanism. But
as the service itself  was unreliable,  the threat  was not significant,  and
taxpayers  took  to  not  paying  their  property  taxes  in  retaliation  for  poor  service
delivery.
Administrative  Targets
3.91  Organize  System for Recording  Payment and Tracking  Delinquencies.
Improvements  in collection  administration  must accompany  charges  in the  legal
framework  of the  property  tax. To impose  penalties,  the  taxing  authority  must
know  who  to impose  them  against. Finding  out  can  be  a major  exercise. The  city
of  Amman,  for  example,  confronts  a  minimum  of  four  hundred  thousand  property  tax
payments annually,  each of which must be recorded  and credited  against the
appropriate  taxpayer's  liability. All four  hundred thousand  records  must be
reviewed  periodically  to assemble  the list  of major  delinquents,  against  whom
enforcement  action  will be taken. Where  payment  can  be made in installments,
the  volume  of transactions  increases  proportionately.  The  municipality  of  Rio
permits  payment  in monthly  installments  and confronts  a potential  flood  of 12
million  transactions.
3.92  Where clerical labor is cheap and the volume of transactions  is
relatively  small, a well organized  manual system  can cope effectively  with
collection  monitoring.  Onitsha,  with a population  of two hundred  thousand,
records  payments  in a large  ledger  (permitting  fifty  records  to  be viewed  at a
time)  and  is  reportedly  able  to  easily  identify  the  major  delinquents.  With  the
falling price of small computers,  the case for computerizing  billing and
collection  records  is fairly  strong--particularly  in large  cities.  Brazil  is
promoting  the use of microcomputers  for billing  and collection  in the larger
cities  served  by  its  national  technical assistance program.  Smaller
jurisdictions  are encouraged  to share regional  computers,  through  individual
terminals  linked  through  telephone  lines.
3.93  In  Indonesia, a  pilot project in Tangerang is  addressing the
information  management  problem  by shifting  it to private  banks.  Within the
pilot  project  area,  taxpayers  are  instructed  to  make their  property  tax  payment
at a specific  bank branch, which is responsible  for receiving  payment and
identifying  delinquents.
3.94  jecentgalize  Collection  Facilities. The sheer inconvenience  of the
procedures  required  to  pay  the  property  tax  can  also  adversely  affect  collection
efficiency,  discouraging  taxpayers  who would otherwise  be willing to comply.
It is not unusual--given  the  unreliability  of the  mails--for  local  government
to require  property  taxes to be paid in person.  In Manganilla,  Philippines,
taxes  must  be paid  in  person  at  city  hall,  during  the  first  two  weeks  of  January.
Taxpayers  report  waiting  times  of several  days.- 29 -
3.95  Collection  can be made more convenient  by decentralizing  it.  In
Calcutta  payment  can  be made  at  branch  offices  of  city  hall. In  Rio  and  Karachi,
payment  can  be  made  at  any  branch  of  an  authorized  commercial  bank.  (These  banks
are required  to deposit  the  receipts  in the  account  of the  municipality  after
a specified  time period.  Interest  on the float  in the interim  provides  the
banks'  compensation.)
3.96  Administrative  solutions  alone are unlikely  to have much impact  of
collection  performance  however.  Dysfunctional  collection  monitoring  systems
often reflect deliberate political choices, as  they prevent embarrassing
delinquencies  from  coming  to  light  and  maximize  opportunities  for  discretionary
enforcement.  They are, however,  a necessary complement  to changes in the
institutional  and  political  incentives  confronting  taxing  authorities,  discussed
below.- 30 -
IV.  CHAQING INSTITUTINAL INCENTIVES
4.1  A variety  of institutional  arrangements  are  used  to administer  the
property  tax. Responsibility  for  valuation,  for  example,  can  be assigned  to
either  central  or local  government.  Collection,  similarly,  may  be either  a
central  or local  government  function.  Private  companies  may  play  a role  in
either  phase  of  the  administration  of  the  tax.
4.2  A  typology  of  administrative  arrangements  for  valuation  and  collection
is  illustrated  in  Table  4.  As  shown,  examples  of  all  four  basic  options  are
found  in both industrial  and developing  countries. Completely  centralized
systems--with  the  central  government  both  valuing  and  collecting--are  found  in
France  and Sweden,  and in Turkey,  Jordan,  Cote d'Ivoire,  Indonesia,  and
Pakistan.A  Completely  decentralized  systems--with  local  government  performing
both these functions--are  found  in the United  States,  Japan,  Brazil,  the
Philippines,  India,  and  some  Nigerian  states.  Split  systems--where  the  central
government  values  but  local  governments  collect--are  found  in  the  United  Kingdom
and Germany. Among  developing  countries,  Colombia  and  Kenya  employ  split
systems,  except  in their  largest  cities  (where  administration  is completely
decentralized).  The  obverse  form  of  split  system--where  local  governments  value
and  central  governments  collect--exist  in  the  Netherlands  and  Tunisia.
4.3  If  Centralized.  Provide Incentives:  If Decentralized.  Address
Com2etoWp_.  Experience  with  the  four  options  suggests  that  none  is  a  guarantor
of  success  or  of  failure.  Under  the  right  conditions,  any  of  the  four  can  work.
Reorganization  is  therefore  not  a  sine  qua  non  of  property  tax  reform,  regardless
of  the  existing  administrative  structure.
4.4  A comparison  of the  four  options  nevertheless  suggests  that  some
patterns  are  more  likely  to  succeed  than  others,  because  of  the  way  they  exploit
differences  in  the  incentives  confronting  central  and  local  government,  and  the
way  that  they  deal  with  the  need  for  disinterested  technical  expertise  in  certain
aspects  of  administration  of  the  tax.
4.5  The  choice between central and  local administration  can be
characterized--with  some  exaggeration--as  a tradeoff  between  indifference  and
incompetence.  As  central  governments  derive  no  revenue  from  the  property  tax,
the  tax  tends  to  get  low  priority  when  it  is  centrally  administered.  In  Cote
d'Ivoire  the  central  government's  taxing  authority  assigns  much  less  priority
to  the  property  tax  than  it  does  to  the  principal  taxes  supporting  the  central
government.
4.6  Local  administration,  in contrast,  tends  to be characterized  by
apparent  incompetence.  This  is in  part  due  to the  technical  difficulty  of
certain  aspects  of  tax  administration-  -particularly  the  calibration  of  unit  costs
and the valuation  of unique  forms  of property.  It also reflects  local
government's  greater  vulnerability  to local  political  pressure--a  case of
political  responsiveness  acting  in  the  guise  of  technical  incompetence.
lfi/  in Pakistan,  responsibility  for valuation  and collection  rests  with
provincial  governments,  which  transfer  collections  to  municipal  authorities.- 31 -
Table  4:  VARIANTS  OF ADMINISTRATIVE  ARRANGELENIS
central  Govemgrnmet  Local  _Qovernmfent
C  France  j  Netherlands
E  Turkey  Tunisia
N  Cote  d'Ivoire
T  Pakistan*
C  R  Indonesia  I
O  A  Sweden  I
L  L  Jordan
L
c,  - --  - - --  ----------  ----------
C  I
T  L  United  Kingdom  I  United  States
I  0  Nigeria  (Anambra)  I  Brazil
O  C  Kenya**  India
N  A  Germany  I  Nigeria  (Oyo)
L  Colombia**  I  Japan
Mexico***
Philippines
|  *  Provincial  government  values.
- **  Except  in largest  cities,  where  local  government  values.
-***  Valuation  or collection  performed  by state  governments  in some
jurisdictions.
4.7  In making the tradeofi  between incompetence  and indifference,  the
balance  may fall  differently  for  valuation  than  for collection. Valuation  is
a more technically  difficult  task, involving  some degree  of discretion  (and
therefore  vulnerability  to  political  influence). In  valuation,  the  competence
of a central  government  may therefore  be worth the risk of its  indifference.
Collection, with  its  immediate impact on  revenue and  its  relatively
straightforward  administrative  requirements,  may  be  more  appropriately  assigned
to local  government.  This  would  suggest  a system  of  split  administration--with
central valuation and local collection--as  is found in Germany and, until
recently,  the  United  Kingdom.
4.8  But there  are  equally  effective  ways to resolve  the  problem. Except
in its largest  cities,  Colombia  relies  on central  government  to perform  the
valuation  function. It  addresses  the  indifference  inherent  in  central  valuation
by assigning  this  function  to  a parastatal,  whose  income  is  based  on valuation
fees  paid  by local  government.  Brazil  and  the  Philippines,  in  contrast,  assign
the  valuation  function  to  local  government  but  address  their  incompetence  through
national  programs  of technical  assistance.- 32 -
4.9  In  allocating administrative  responsibilities  between levels of
government,  governments  also  can  distinguish  between  the  pattern  appropriate  to
large  cities  and  that  appropriate  to  smaller  jurisdictions.  Colombia  and  Kenya
both permit local  valuation  in their largest  cities,  where the magnitude  of
val.uation  work would justify retaining  technical  experttse,  while providing
central  valuation  services  to smaller  jurisdictions.- 33
V.  ONCLUSION:  STRTEIS  FOR  REFORM
5.1  In the last twenty  years,  international  donor agencies  and central
governments  have made numerous  efforts to increase  property  tax revenues  in
developing  countries.  Approaches  to reform  can  be grouped  in three  categories.
a.  Studies:  World  Bank interventions  have  most often  taken  the form
of  project-financed  studies.  Major  studies  of  local  taxation  have,  for
example,  been financed  under  projects  in Madhya  Pradesh  (India)  and
Karachi (Pakistan). An urban  project  in Madras (India)  financed  a
major  investigation  into  alternative  means  of  addressing  the  valuation
problem  posed  by rent  controls. In Mali, the  Bank financed  a study
of the  feasibility  of a property-linked  refuse  collection  tax.
b.  Loan conditions:  The Bank has also used loan contitions  to
encourage  property  tax reform. The second  Kenya  urban  project,  for
example,  required  the  government  to establish  a rating  and  valuation
unit in the  Ministry  of Local  Government  and to undertake  a general
revaluation  of properties  in the  project  cities. The third  Calcutta
urban  project  similarly  required  the  establishment  of a  metropolitan
valuation  authority  and  mandated  general  property  .valuations  in  the
project  jurisdictions.
C.  Financing  for implementation:  More recently,  Bank  projects  have
also  financed  implementation  costs  of  property  tax  reforms.  In  Jakarta
(Indonesia)  the  Bank  is  financing  a *-evaluation  of  high-value  property
and  a  pilot  program  in  collection  administration.  In  Accra  (Ghana)  the
Bank  recently  financed  a  remapping  and  revaluation  exercise.  A  similar
attempt  is  under  discussion  in  Lagos,  Nigeria.
5.2  Other  donors  and  central  governments  are  equally  active  in  the  field.
USAID has been a longtime  supporter  of the Philippines'  Real Property  Tax
Administration (RPTA) program, an  effort to  introduce map-based property
identification  and  mass  appraisal  on  a  national  scale. The  Brazilian  government
similarly  is the sponsor  of a remapping  and revaluation  program  that  has  been
implemented  in  more than twelve  hundred  Brazilian  municipios.'9
5.3  The available  evidence  suggests  that these interventions  have had
relatively  limited  impact  on revenues. Detailed  studies  of the  Philippine  and
Brazilian  programs  and other, anecdotal,  evidence  suggests that even where
administrative  reforms  have been carried  out, these  have had little  long term
revenue  impact. At best,  projects  have improved  the  fairness  of property  tax
administration,  by increasing  the  comprehensiveness  of coverage  and increasing
the accuracy  of property information  used in deriving  valuations.  But the
revenue  effects  of these  improvements  have  been  reduced  by low  tax  rates  and  low
collection efficiency.  This record provides several lessons for  future
interventions.
/  The  Philippines  and  Brazil  programs  are  described  in  Annex  2.- 34  -
5.4  Address  Collection  Am  Well  Ag  Valuation. One  frequent  problem  in  the
design  of interventions  is  an excessive  concentration  on the  "upstream"  stages
of property tax administration--discovery  and valuation--to  the neglect of
collection.  Given  the  extremely  low  level  of  collection  efficiency  in  developing
countries,  much of the  effort  spent in mapping  and  valuation  is likely  to be
wasted  if  corresponding efforts  ara  not  made  to  improve  collection
administration:  newly  discovered  and  valued  property  does  not  yield  revenue  if
the system  of collection  administration  is dysfunctional. Evidence  from the
Philippines  and  Brazil  programs  suggests,  in  fact, that  collection  efficiency--
which had averaged  50% before project intervention--declined  following  the
completion  of  tax  administration  projects,  substantially  offsetting  the  programs'
impacts  on yields.
5.5  Under some  conditions2'  there  is,  in fact,  a good case for  starting
the process of administrative  reform  at the collection  end of the taxation
process. This can be  a more efficient  use of effort--in that collection
improvements  directly  result in increased  revenue,  without depending  upon a
subsequent  phase of administration. And it can yield results  more quickly:
sorting records to identify  major delinquents,  combined with conspicuous
enforcement  of penalties,  can  produce  a  major  one-time  increase  in  collections
on arrears,  as  well as  have  a salutary  effect  on collection  efficiency  over  the
long  term.
5.6  Address  Policy  As Well  As Administrat  Reform  efforts  have also
tended  to focus  too  narrowly  on administration  of the tax, to the neglect  of
property  tax  policy. Property  tax  policies--the  rate  structure  and the  method
of revaluation--are  key determinants  of the  level  and  buoyancy  of the  property
tax. If  nominal  tax  rates  remain  at  low  levels,  administrative  improvements  will
have little  revenue  impact  in  absolute  terms. Even  substantial  one-time  impacts
can  be offset  if  procedures  permitting  annual  adjustr-ents  in  valuations  are  not
introduced.
5.7  The  experience of  property tax  administration  projects in  the
Philippines  and  Brazil  suggests  that  improvements  in  administration  of the  tax
will, in fact, tend to increase  political  pressure  for rate reductions:  as
valuations  rise,  property  owners  will  campaign  for  lower  rates  to  keep  their  tax
liabilities  from increasing. Bowing  to that  pressure  can reduce  tax revenues
to the  level  at  which  the  tax  is  not  worth  collecting. In the  Philippines,  the
central government  refused  to permit  RPTA valuations  to be made in current
prices.  As a result,  tax liabilities,  post project,  averaged  only $3.80  per
property.  In Brazil,  similarly,  tax liabilities  in the northern  municipios
averaged  less  than  $9.80,  post  project.  Rough  cost  calculations  from  the  Brazil
program  suggest  that  if local  authorities  had been  forced  to amortize  the  full
cost  of  the  program out  of  revei  4es  (along with  recurrent costs  of
administration),  many  would  not  have  seen  a  positive  cash  flow  from  the  property
tax  for  up to five  years.
20/  That is,  provided  the  gaps  in  coverage  and  the  inequities  in  valuation  are
not too  egregious.- 35 -
5.8  Keen AdMinistrative  Cost& Pronortionate  to Revenus.  Because  the
yields  of the  property  tax  depend  upon both policy  and administration,  it  is
difficult define the  appropriate level of  expenditure on  property tax
administration.  As  the Brazil and Philippines  cases illustrate,  a major
investment  in  improved  administration  may  yield  no  financial  return.  Conversely,
a  virtually  costless  increase  in  the  tax  rate  can  increase  yields  substantially.
The  question  of  how  much  to  spend  on  property  tax  administration  is  nevertheless
very relevant--particularly  were donors  and  central  governments  are  poised  to
invest  substantial  amounts  in  surveying  and information  management  technology.
5.9  At a  minimum,  it is  clear  that  the  costs  of tax  administration  should
not be so high that taxpayers  would  be better  off if the tax  were abolished
entirely.  This implies  a fairly  tight  ceiling  on the administrative  costs.
While the municipal treasury  may regard  all revenues,  net of administration
costs,  as  benefits,  the  taxpayers'  perspective  is  more  demanding:  while  taxation
implies  benefits  in  the  form  of  municipal  services,  it  also  implies  costs  in  the
form of reduced private consumption.  To generate n  benefits from the
taxpayers'  perspective,  the gains from increased  public expenditure  have to
exceed  the  value  of forgone  private  (consumption  plus the  direct  and indirect
administrative  costs  implied  by the  tax). In  practice,  this  is  not  a  calculation
that  can  be made  with any  precision. But it suggests  that  the  obvious  rule--
"Do  not  spend  more  on administration  than  you  expect  to  gain  in  revenue"--is  not
restrictive  enough. Where  the recurrent  costs  of administration  are expected
to  consume  a substantial  proportion  of projected  tax  revenues--say,  over  25%--
then  less  costly,  if less  accurate,  procedures  for  administering  the  tax  should
be considered.
5.10  Address  Underlying  Political  Disincentives.  If  any  intervention  is  to
be sustainable,  it must also address the underlying  political factors  that
discourage  the effective  exploitation  of the property  tax.  The failure  to
increase  rates,  to adjust  valuations  to  reflect  current  prices--as  well as the
failure  to devote  sufficient  resources  to the  recurrent  costs  of administering
the  tax--reflect  political  as  well  as  technical  constraints  on the  property  tax.
Project  experience  suggests  that  unless  these  constraints  are  addressed,  efforts
at reform  will  have little  lasting  impact.
5.11  The property  tax generates  a level  of political  opposition  that is
disproportionate  to its  yields. As noted  earlier,  the  property  tax  accounts  for
only 1.3% of the average  tax burden  in developing  countries.  A doubling  of
property  tax yields therefore  would represent  only a minor increase  in the
average  tax  burden. But in  developing  countries  the  property  tax  stands  out  as
one  of the  few  occasions  where  a large  proportion  of  urban  households  confronts
a  tax  bill. Two  thirds  of  government  tax  revenues  in such  countries  are  derived
from  indirect  taxes,  whose  ultimate  incidence  is largely  hidden  in the  form  of
higher  prices. In  middle  income  developing  countries,  direct  taxes  on  personal
income  and  payroll  taxes  are  also  significant,  but  even  their  political  profile
is  moderated. Coverage--particularly  of the  personal  income  tax--is  still  far
from  universal. And  because  these  taxes  are  effectively  collected  only  through
withholding,  opportunities  for  evasion  are limited.
5.12  The property  tax, in  contrast,  has none  of these  political  virtues.
Unlike indirect  taxes,  it is highly  visible to the individuals  who bear its- 36  -
ultimate  incidence--particularly  the  owner-occupants  of residential  property.
Unlike  income  taxes,  its  burden  falls  broadly. And  because  it  cannot  be imposed
through  withholding,  opportunities  for  evasion  are rife.  It is therefore  not
popular  and  is regarded  with  ambivalence  by both  central  and  local  government.
5.13  Recheck  Objectives.  The  inherent  political  liabilities  of  the  property
tax  suggest  that  any  effort  at  reform  should  begin,  first,  with  a  clarification
of objectives--specifically  whether  intervention  is  aimed  solely  at increasing
revenues,  or  whether  it is intended  to  promote  wider  efficiency  objectives.
5.14  The  property  tax  is  only  one  of several  means  of increasing  municipal
revenues. As shown in Annex Figure  2, intergovernmental  revenue  sharing  and
local  indirect  taxes  are  also  used  to  finance  the  nonchargeable  services  provided
by municipal  government.  If  the  objective  of intervention  is  simply  to  increase
recurrent revenues,  then revenue sharing and indirect  taxes may be better
targets. Revenue  sharing  provides  local  governments  with  a  means  of  exploiting
the less  politically  sensitive  central  government  tax instruments. And local
indirect  taxes  share  the  political  advantages  of central  indirect  taxes:  to a
great  extent,  their  ultimate  burden  can  be  disguised  in  the  form  of  higher  prices
and  exported  onto taxpayers  in other  jurisdictions.
5.15  But neither revenue  sharing  nor local indirect  taxes provides  the
efficiency  benefits  of local  prope-ty  taxation. Revenue  sharing  cannot  reflect
willingness  to  pay. Local  indirect  taxes  disguise  the  burden  of  local  services,
and under some conditions  allow  taxpayers  to impose  it on taxpayers  in other
jurisdictions. If efficiency--as  well as revenue--is  the objective,  then  the
property  tax  is  the  appropriate  target.  To  achieve  it,  the  political  constraints
must be addressed.
5.16  Reduce_Central  Policy  Control. Given  the  diversity  of institutional
arrangements  for  property  taxation,  the definition  of which  government  agency
is  relevant  will  vary. Project  experience  nevertheless  provides  several  general
principles.  First,  as  noted  earlier,  there  is  a  clear  case  for  reducing  central
control  over the  key  policy  variables--the  setting  of tax  rates  and  the  timing
and extent  of valuation  adjustments. Central  governments'  incentives  in this
regard are  inherently  suspect, as they derive no revenue from the tax.
Decentralizing  control  over policy  to local government  removes  one layer  of
disincentives  and shifts control to the level of government  most directly
affected  by it:  local  government.
5.17  Second,  where  central  government  is  responsible  for  administering  the
tax, there is a strong  case for allowing  this function  to be performed  on a
contractual  basis.  Reversing  the client-contractor  relationship  between the
valuation  office  and the local  authority  can  be a means  of addressing  central
government's  inherent  lack  of interest  in  making  the  tax  work  well.
5.18  Restructure  Local  Revenue  Sources. Disincentives  at the  local  level
must  also  be  addressed.  Given  the  inherent  political  liabilities  of  the  property
tax, sustained  improvement  is  unlikely  as long as more politically  attractive
means  of increasing  resources  are  available. The  availability  of  open-ended  or
discretionary  grants, or unrestricted  indirect local taxes, has generally
undercut  efforts  to improve  property  tax administration  by local  government.- 37 -
In Brazil,  for example,  large-scale  recurrent  transfers,  combined  with
discretionary  grants  and vaguely  defined  functional  responsibilities,  have
largely  eliminated  any  sustained  local  support  for  property  taxation  in  small
municipalities.
5.19  Where  these  alternatives  have  been  reduced,  in  contrast,  political
support  for property  tax reform  has been greatest.  The elimination  of
intergovernmental  grants  to  Accra,  for  example,  is  credited  with  providing  the
motive  force  behind  that  city's  recent  property  tax  reforms. Similarly,  the
elimination  of discretionary  grants  to  the  municipality  of Rio  following  the
election  of  an  opposition  mayor  is  credited  with  motivating  Rio's  property  tax
reform  during  the  late  1980s.
5.20  The  objective  of  changing  the  structure  of  local  revenues  is  not  to
increase  property  tax  revenues  per  se. High  property  tax  revenues  are  not  an
end  in  themselves.  But  in  reducing  the  extent  of  arbitrary  subsidies  between
jurisdictions  and  confronting  local  taxpayers  with  the  cost  of  the  services  they
consume,  these  changes  are  consistent  with,  and  necessary  to,  the  pursuit  of  the
efficiency  objective  that  is  the  principal  justification  for  property  tax  reform.ANNEX.  I
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Figure  3- W  -- s-m~~AN9  I 
Description  gf Property-  Tax  Administr'tion  Programs
in  Brazil  and the  PhiliRRines
1.  For purposes  of this study,  two detailed  case studies  of property  tax
intervention  were evaluated.  While both have received  World Bank funding,
neither  represents  a Bank-led  initiative. The first is the Philippines  Real
Property  Tax  Administration  Pro4ect  (RPTA),  financed  by USAID;  the  second,  the
Brazilian  Program  for  Municipal  Technical-Administrative  Improvement  (CIATA),
financed  by the  Brazilian  government.
2.  Both  programs  are  ambitious:  they  aim  to  reform  property  tax  administration
on a  national  scale,  in  countries  where  both  valuation  and  collection  are  local
responsibilities.  Both  aim  to have  lasting  impacts,  by introducing  procedural
change. As targets  for  evaluation,  the  two  projects  have  an additional  virtue:
they are longstanding,  providing  the  opportunity  to evaluate  their  impacts  ex
post  facto,  and  to  benefit  from  modifications  made in  response  to  early  problems
in implementation.
Proiect  Description
3.  RPTA and  CIATA  were  both initiated  in response  to a similar  diagnosis  of
the  problem.  Local  governments  were perceived  as having  inadequate  revenues.
This  was attributed  to  a failure  to  exploit  the  property  tax,  which  was  in turn
attributed  to problems  in administration  of the tax--specifically  the  failure
of existing  procedures  to produce  comprehensive,  accurate  information  on the
physical  characteristics  of the  tax  base.
4.  The design  of both programs  responded  to this diagnosis.  Both aimed to
change  the  way property  is discovered  and identified. Both jump-started  the
procedural  reform  by producing:  (1)  a new  set  of  parcel  maps,  incorporating  all
properties  in  the  jurisdiction;  (2)  new  property  records,  based  on field  surveys
of all properties  in the  jurisdiction,  and  (3)  a new set  of billing  records,
incorporating  the  revised  property  data. Transmission  of knowledge  was  ensured
by involvement  of TA recipients  in the  production  of these  products. 1'
5.  The two  programs  are executed  in the form of a standardized  package  of
technical  assistance,  delivered  over  a  fixed  time  period  to  preselected  groups
of  municipalities.  In the  Philippines,  the  program  is  managed  by the  Office  of
Local  Government  Finance  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance. In  Brazil,  the  program  is
sponsored  by the  equivalent  unit in the  Ministry  of Finance  but is executed  by
staff  of the  government  data-processing  parastatal.
1/  The details of the programs differed  slightly  in response  to differing
preproject  conditions:  The  Brazilian  program  aimed  at  resuscitating  an  existing
map-based inventory system  that  had  fallen  into  disrepair in  smaller
municipalities.  The Philippines  program  aimed  at a fundamental  change  in the
system  of discovery;  replacing  a system  based on owner-declarations  with one
using  map-based  government  inventories.-41 
6.  Individual  projects  are  executed  in five  steps:
Mgbiliza£5gn.  At  the outset, the program manager arrives on site,
assembles  a project  team (consisting  of staff of the local  valuer and
temporary  hires), organizes  office space, and procures  materials  and
equipment.
PreRaration  of  Reference  MaR. The  project  team  then  assembles  an initial
reference  map  on  the  basis  of  existing  parcel  maps,  subdivision  plans,  and
road  and  utility  maps;  it  then  makes  an  initial  reconciliation  of  existing
property  tax  records  with  parcel  information.
Field  Work. ProJect  teams  then  take  to  the  field  to  verify  and  supplement
data on the  physical  characteristics  of the land and structures--to  be
subsequently  used  in  preparing  parcel  maps  calculating  individual  property
valuations--and  information  on  claimants  to  ownership--to  be subsequently
used in  billing  and  collection.V
Calculation  of  Unit Costs. While  the  field  work is  ongoing,  the  project
manager  oversees  preparation  of new  unit  cost  tables.
Preparation  of  Assessment  Roll.  Post-field,  the  project  team  then  converts
parcel  sketches  into  base  maps,  calculates  individual  property  valuations
by applying  the  unit  cost  tables  to the  characteristics  of each  property,
and--after  the appeal  opportunity--prepares  individual  property  records
for  delivery  to the  treasurer.
7.  In Brazil,  the  sequence  is  normally  implemented  in three  to five  months;
in the  Philippines,  one  year.
Technical  ImRact
8.  Within  the  confines  of their  specific  objectives,  the  programs  appear  to
be an effective  means  of delivering  technical  assistance  on a  mass scale. The
average  RPTA  project  is estimated  to increase  valuations  by about  40%: 20%  of
this  increase  is  due  to the  discovery  of  missing  land  parcels;  the  remainder  is
due to the  application  of more accurate  property  information  to the  valuation
of  properties  already  on the  rolls. In  Brazil,  CIATA's  impact  is  more  difficult
to document,  but it appears  to be substantial. The average  project  increases
the number  of discovered  properties  by about 50%.  The application  of more
accurate  property  data  to existing  properties  also,  presumably,  increases
2/  In the  Philippines,  this  work is  carried  out  by teams  of four,  consisting  of
a supervisor,  a tax  mapping  aide (responsible  for sketching  parcel  boundaries
on the  base  map),  a  data  gatherer  (who  acts  as  custodian  of  tax  declarations  and
is  responsible  for  verifying  and  updating  the  data),  and  the  local  ward  captain.
Production  averages  twenty  parcels  per  day.  In  Brazil,  field  work is  carried  out
by teams  of two,  with average  of fifteen  completions  per day.- 42 -
valuations,  although  the  extent  of this impact  cannot  be measured  accurately.'
And  preliminary  evidence  suggests  that  procedural  reforms  introduced  under  the
programs  have  been successfully  picked  up and  run  with  by local  valuers.
9.  These  impacts  were achieved  on a mass  scale  and at relatively  low  cost.
In  twelve  years  of operation,  1,282  CIATA  projects  were  completed,  at  an  average
cost  of $6.50  per  parcel. The  Philippine's  RPTA  completed  571  projects  in  five
years,  at an average  cost  of $5.60  per  parcel.
10.  The  success  of  the  programs  as  delivery  mechanisms  for  technical  assistance
is attributable  to a  number  of characteristics:
(a)  good  bureaucratic  fit:  In  both  programs,  the  government  agencies  that
had veto power  over technical  improvements  were coopted  into the
program.  In the  Philippines,  the  program  was initially  managed  by
the  Ministry  of  Local  Government;  local  valuers,  however,  report  to
the  Ministry  of Finance--bureaucratic  obstacles  were resolved  when
the  management  of the  program  was shifted  to  MOF.
(b)  experienced  on-site  project management:  Individual  projects are
directed  by  a  project  manager-  -who  remains  on  site  throughout  project
implementation--and  as a  member  of a  permai,ent  TA staff  is  able  to
draw on experience  gained  in  prior  projects.
(c)  packaged technical  material:  TA is delivered as a  standardized
package,  using  identical  materials  and  following  essentially  the  same
sequence  of  steps  in  each  project  municipality,  eliminating  the  need
to reinvent  the  wheel  for  each  project.
(d)  integration  of  TA  recipients  in  project  implementation:  The  division
of  labor  between  the  program  management  staff  and  local  counterparts
ensures  that TA is successful  in transferring  knowledge  to users.
TA staff responsibility  is confined  to management;  projects  are
implemented  by  the regular assessor's  staff and locally hired
interns.
(e)  appropriate  technical  standards:  The projects'  low  costs  were due
in part to adoption  of technical  standards  minimal  to meet fiscal
requirements.  Neither  project  aimed  to  make  a  precise  determination
of  boundaries  or to  adjudicate  title;  the  number  of  variables  used
as basis  for  valuation  was limited.
.X  Because  all  property  valuations  are indexed  each  year,  the impact  of better
property  data  cannot  be separated  from  the  impact  of  across-the-board  inflation
adjustments  on the  basis  of the  data  at hand.- 43 -
(f)  local hiring: Staff costs were minimized by  hiring temporary
inexperienced  locals  and  giving  crash  training  courses.  4
Revenue  Impact
11.  Despite  their  success  in improving  data on the  physical  cl.-racteristics
of the  tax  base,  neither  program  had the  expected  income  on tax  revenues. The
rate  of  growth  in  actual  collections  was  lower  than  expected,  and  absolute  levels
of  tax  liabilities  remained  trivial.  In  the  Philippines  case,  actual  collections
increased  by only 1.1%,  with revenue  per parcel  averaging  only US$3.80.  In
Brazil,  revenues  increased,  in real terms,  by an average  of 4%;  with revenues
per  parcel  averaging  $9.80.
12.  This  perverse  outcome  was  largely  the  result  of  a  series  of  de  facto  policy
decisions. While the  programs  were expanding  the  physical  definition  of the
base,  policy  makers  were offsetting  the  expansion's  revenue  impact  by reducing
valuations  on existing  properties,  lowering  nominal tax rates,  and relaxing
collection  enforcement. Three  policy  levers  were used:  the unit cost tables
(which  are  the  basis  on  which  physical  data is  converted  to  estimates  of  value),
the  tax  rate (or,  in Brazil,  the  rate  of inflation  indexation),  and  the  extent
of collection  enforcement.
13.  In the Philippines,  the central government  played a prominent role,
prohibiting  the  use  of  current  prices  in the  calculation  of unit  costs--thereby
forcing  valuations  to be made in obsolete  prices.  Tax rates and assesbment
ratios  continued  to  be restricted  by the  central  government,  in  effect  forcing
individual  tax  liabilities  to  decline  in  real  terms. Local  officials,  for  their
part,  refrained  from  any provocative  collection  enforcement,  allowing  average
collection  rates  to  drop  below  50%.
14.  In Brazil,  the key decisions  were made locally. Municipalities  adopted
below-market  unit  cost factors  and  continued  to  adjust  valuations  at below  the
rate of inflation. As in the Philippines,  local  collection  effort  declined.
While  these  decisions  were  made  locally,  they  reflect  incentives  implicit  in  the
structure  of intergovernmental  relations that remove incentives  for taking
political  risks  with  local  taxation. Smaller  municipalities  benefit  from  large
transfers  under  Brazil's  system  of  revenue  sharing,  obviating  the  need  for  a  high
absolute  level  of local  taxation. Politically  innocuous  means of increasing
local resources  at the margin also exist.  Ambiguities  in the division  of
functional  responsibilities  raise  the prospect  of negotiated  contributions  in
kind.  A variety  of ad hoc grants  are  also  available.
ii  Neither the Brazilian  nor the Philippine  program  reported  any problem in
hiring and  motivating trainable staff. The  Philippine program preferred
unemployed  college  graduates,  who had backgrounds  in engineering  or planning.
Brazil  preferred  less  well-educated  staff,  having  found  that  university  graduates
are  more adept  at outwitting  program  supervision  and  verification  systems.ANNEX II
Terms  of Reference
Preparation  of a Property  Tax  Rehabilitation  Program
for  Country  x
Background  and  Objectives
1.  The  Government of  Country x  is considering  a  major effort to
rehabilitate  its  existing  system  of urban  property  taxation. At present,  the
property  tax is administered  by municipal  councils. Systems  of valuation  and
collection  are  badly  deteriorated.  A  large  number  of  properties  are  missing  from
the  tax  rolls,  the  property  information  used for  valuation  is  out of date,  and
collection  performance  is  poor.
2.  The  World  Bank  has  expressed  interest  in  supporting  such  an effort  as
part  of  an  upcoming  urban  development  project.  To  assess  the  merits  of the  idea,
both  the  Government  and  the  World  Bank  require  a  more  detailed  definition  of  what
it would  entail. The  objective  of this  assignment,  therefore,  is to prepare  a
detailed  proposal for a nationwide  property tax rehabilitation  program for
Country  x. The  proposal  will  be the  basis  for  a  project  appraisal  and  would  then
guide  the implementation  of the  program  itself.
ScoRe  of  Work
Task 1: Diagnosis
3.  The  consultant  will  review  the  existing  system  of  property  taxation  in
the  capital  city and  a limited  number  of smaller  councils.  This review  will
encompass  the  entire  sequence  of steps  involved  in the administration  of the
property  tax:
- discovery  and identification  (that  is, the system  for
ensuring  th&t all properties  are included  on the tax
rolls  and that  changes  in the tax  base are discovered
and incorporated  as they  occur);
- valuation;
- rate setting;
- billing (including  procedures  for initially  notifying
taxpayers  of their  liability);  and
- collection  (including  systems  for  monitoring  delinquent
accounts  and  enforcing  payment).
4.  On the  basis  of this  assessment,  the  consultant  will identify:
(a)  key stages  in  administration  of the  tax  where  revenue  losses  are
occurring;  that  is,  (1)  what  proportion  of  properties  are  missing  from- 45
the  rolls,  (2)  whether  valuations  are accurate,  (3)  the  nominal  tax
rate  and  exemption  policies,  and (4)  the  proportion  of demand  that  is
collected.
(b)  the  procedural  problems  behind  the leaks:  (1)  how are  Droperties
discovered  and new valuations  made; (2) what is the sy.tem for
adjusting  rates;  (3)  what is the  billing  and  collection  system.
(c)  the  environment  in  which  reform  must  operate:  (1)  characteristics
of the market:  prevailing  system  of tenure,  extent  to which market
data  of  any  type  readily  available,  etc.  (2)  characteristics  of  policy
setting  environment:  what  other  revenue  sources;  what level (levels)
of government  set  policy.
Task  2: Outline  Rehabilitation  Strategy
5.  Based upon his review  of the existing  system,  the consultant  will
outline  a strategy  for  property  tax  rehabilitation,  describing  the  major  phases
of the  work and the  institutional  arrangements  for implementing  them.
6.  It is anticipated  that the program  would be implemented  in three
phases:
- detailed  design  (including  revisions  in  legislation  and
preparation  of  manuals  for  the  new  system:;  of  discovery,
valuation,  billing,  and  collection  to  be adopted);
- implementation  of  a  general  resurvey  and  revaluation  of
all  properties;  and
- an  initial operating period, following the general
resurvey,  during  which  the  new  procedures,  staffing,  and
institutional  arrangements  would  be tested.
7.  This  specific  phasing  of the  program  should  not  be considered  binding
on the  consultant.
8.  In outlining the rehabilitation  strategy, the consultant  will be
cognizant  of two  primary  concerns:
- costs:  Given  the  limitations  on  the  underlying  tax  base,
extremely  low  administrative  costs  will  be required  if
the  system  is  to  show  an acceptable  administrative  cost
ratio.  The proposal  should  therefore  be judicious  in
its  requirements  for  technical  assistance  (particularly
in  the  labor-intensive  implementation  phase)  and  in  its
choice  of technology.- 46
- sustainability:  The  proposal  should  aim at producing  a
sustainable  system  of property  taxation,  rather  than  a
one-time  general  resurvey  and  revaluation.  The  proposal
will therefore  identify the means by which lasting
institutional,  procedural,  and staffing improvements
would  be achieved.
Task 3:  Detailed  Program  Design
9.  The  consultant  will  prepare  a  detailed  program  proposal,  encompassing
the  following  elements:
- a  listing of  specific steps to be  undertaken in
implementing  the program, including  a timetable for
implementing  each  step  and  a  designation  of  the  position
or institution  responsible  for  doing  so;
- an identification  of complementary  Government  actions
that  are considered  critical  to the  program's  success
(including,  if  appropriate,  changes  in  the  institutional
arrangements  for administering  the property tax and
major  changes  in  property  tax  legislation);
- an estimate  of the  cost of implementing  each phase  of
the program, detailed  by component (such  as expert
consultants,  vehicles  and  equipment,  permanent
government  staff,  and fixed  term  unskilled  staff);
- an  estimate  of  the  staffing  implications  of the  proposed
strategy,  including  a breakdown  by skill  category  for
both  the  resurvey-and-revaluation  phase  and  the
subsequent  operating  phase;
- an estimate  of the long term  annual  cost of operating
the system, the expected  yield of the tax (at rates
agreed with Government),  and the resulting  expected
administrative  cost  ratios;  and
- a  set  of  job  descriptions  (and  draft  terms  of  reference,
in the case of consultants)  for key managerial  and
professional  positions.
OutRuts
10.  The consultant  will report  the findings  and recommendations  of all
three  tasks in the form of a report,  to be submitted  to the  upon
completion  of the  assignment.Contact
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